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INSIDE VOICES: PROTECTING THE
STUDENT-CRITIC IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
*

JOSIE FOEHRENBACH BROWN

First Amendment doctrine acknowledges the constructive potential of citizens’
criticism of public officials and governmental policies by offering such speech vigilant
protection. However, when students speak out about perceived injustice or dysfunction
in their public schools, teachers and administrators too often react by squelching and
even punishing student-critics. To counteract school officials’ reflexively repressive
responses to student protest and petition activities, this Article explains why the
faithful performance of public schools’ responsibility to prepare students for
constitutional citizenship demands the adoption of a more receptive and respectful
attitude toward student dissent. After documenting how both educators and courts
have mistakenly devalued important messages from young dissenters, this Article
explores how to reformulate the doctrinal approaches used to resolve challenges to the
suppression of student-critics and urges courts to recalibrate overly deferential
assessments of educators’ claims that student dissent compromises effective learning.
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INTRODUCTION
The many youthful faces among the protesters of the Arab Spring
and the Occupy Wall Street encampments exemplify the energizing
role a nation’s younger generation has played in advancing demands
for social change and institutional reform. Youth’s challenges to
official repression and governments’ infidelity to essential values
serve as catalytic provocations. However, protests and petitions by
America’s public school students are too often ignored, squelched,
and even punished by teachers and administrators. These reactions
reflect a deeply flawed assessment of the constitutional interests at
stake when students speak out about perceived problems at school.
Even in relatively recent American experience, repression has not
been a governmental response reserved for youthful voices of
1
petition and protest. However, when children and youth seek
protection of such expression, they face particularly formidable
obstacles in schools and courts. The hostility to such expressive
efforts by the young stems from a misguided unwillingness to see
children as citizens and to see schools as invaluable sites of
constitutional citizenship practice.

1. For critical examinations of increasingly restrictive governmental responses
to attempts to use public spaces for political protest, see Thomas P. Crocker,
Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2587 (2007); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of
Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239 (2008); and Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial
Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581 (2006).
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Protests at public schools have generated foundational First
2
Amendment precedents. By examining controversies arising from
students’ protests and petitions, this Article seeks to explore the
constitutional parameters of children’s citizenship and to discern the
nature and limits of school officials’ authority to restrict students’
efforts to seek redress for grievances related to school practices. Such
protest and petition activities offer vital citizenship experience for
students, but they can also serve as valuable pedagogical
opportunities for schools. In addressing the student critic, school
officials can deliver a practical translation of often purely abstract
constitutional values, giving substance to core First Amendment
precepts, such as the checking function of dissent within a paradigm
of responsive and accountable governance.
Regrettably, school officials’ reactions to protest and petition
activities may often be fueled by concerns about how criticism could
compromise their preferred image of infallibility or dislodge a
claimed mantle of competence. School officials may try to shield
their decisions from student challenge, using whatever explanatory
leeway can be found within relevant precedents to justify the
suppression or punishment of the student critic. Officials often favor
the defensive stratagem of conflating a student’s allegation of
misused official authority with the incitement of peers to flout the
authority of teachers and administrators.
Such a conflation
conveniently short-circuits sincere engagement with the substance
and origin of student dissent, potentially allowing school officials to
insulate themselves from needed scrutiny. Even less self-serving
school authorities facing the student critic may succumb to the
temptation to react dismissively, discounting the speech’s potential to
spur school improvement and ignoring the educational opportunities
such speech presents.
The doctrinal approaches used by federal courts to resolve
challenges to the suppression or punishment of students who speak

2. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating ordinance’s
content-based prohibition of all picketing outside public schools except labor-related
picketing); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding students could not be punished for wearing anti-war armbands in absence
of showing that such speech would materially disrupt school operations); Sch. Dist.
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (ruling that required Bible
reading and recitation of Lord’s Prayer at start of each school day violated
Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that prescribed
use of prayer, composed by government officials, to begin school day violated
Establishment Clause); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(holding that compelling public school students to salute the American flag or recite
the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment).
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out against perceived injustice or dysfunction at school too often
reinforce school officials’ distorted appraisal of what is at stake in
such controversies. The content of the constitutional principles that
should guide school officials and courts as they strive to strike an
appropriate balance between free expression and institutional
functioning merits renewed examination.
Clarifying the
constitutional dimensions of schools’ instructional agenda could also
help to counteract recent developments in the law of qualified
immunity that may have effectively removed potential legal liability as
a disincentive to deploying maximally restrictive responses against
student dissenters. This topic has also taken on heightened urgency
3
as Garcetti v. Ceballos licensed greater restrictions of public employee
speech and cast a shadow over teachers’ ability to speak out about
administrative or instructional problems in schools.
This Article’s primary aim is to offer educators an explanation of
why schools must adopt a more receptive and respectful attitude
toward student dissent if they are to faithfully perform their
obligation to prepare students for constitutional citizenship. This
Article considers how federal courts could reinforce that
understanding of schools’ obligations by according less deference to
school authorities’ assertions that student dissent compromises
effective learning. Indeed, courts should recognize that a repressive
response to a student critic can compromise effective education for
citizenship far more than the airing of student grievances ever could.
4
In cases like West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Brown
5
v. Board of Education, and School District of Abington Township v.
6
Schempp, children have been agents of transformative American legal
reforms that began in public schools but later reshaped the wider
constitutional consciousness. By recognizing the value of the
perspectives children can offer from within American classrooms and
affording appropriately structured outlets for their nascent political
activism, our schools can come closer to fulfilling their mission to
awaken American children to the duties of constitutional citizenship.
Children are frequently admonished to “use your inside voice” by
supervising adults. In our public schools, that injunction to quiet
down could be recast as an invitation to speak up as educators and
courts recognize that preparing a child to exercise the citizen’s
3. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that a public employee’s statements made
pursuant to his job duties did not warrant First Amendment protection).
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the separate but equal doctrine as applied to
public schools).
6. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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prerogative to dissent may require extending vigilant constitutional
protection to the student-critic.
I.

CULTIVATING CITIZENSHIP CAPABILITIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DISSENT AND THE POWER OF PETITION

As a defining element of America’s constitutionally enforced self7
concept, dissent takes many forms and potentially takes aim at a
variety of targets, challenging established conventions and
institutions. Dissent offers a wide range of benefits to American
society and its citizens, and the protection of dissent should be
understood as a structural imperative as well as an individual’s rightbased expectation. Cultivating the ability to critically engage with
authority should therefore be a central component of citizenship
education.
Dissent aimed at public officials offers practical assistance as it
challenges authority, spurring institutional self-scrutiny and
8
recommending needed reforms. Unchallenged orthodoxy can stifle
9
the individual spirit and sap societies’ creative energy. Extending
vigorous First Amendment protection to dissenters affirms their
potential contributions and signals receptiveness to necessary
correction, an attribute of good and legitimate governance. A
vigilant and critical citizenry exerts an essential corrective influence
on the misdeeds and miscalculations of our public officials. Vincent
Blasi describes the “checking value” of speech in exposing and
10
counteracting the abuse of official power.
Dissent that criticizes the government occupies the core of political
speech, the most vigorously protected zone within the free speech

7. Austin Sarat, Dissent and the American Story: An Introduction, in DISSENTING
VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CITIZENS 1, 1 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2012).
8. John Stuart Mill warned against suppressing dissent and the consequent loss
of “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY,
reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 21 (John Gray ed., 2008).
9. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 82 (2003) (observing that a
possible consequence of making some views “socially off-limits” will be that “what
was once ‘unthinkable’ can become ‘unthought,’” extinguishing possibility of
change (quoting TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 177 (1995))).
10. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 523. Blasi documents how the experiences and intellectual
influences of the First Amendment’s drafters produced a certainty that inclusion of
such a protective provision was essential given the “fragility of constitutional
government.” Id. at 529–37. James Madison, in particular, stressed the citizens’ role
in exposing and seeking redress for official wrongdoing, effectively rejecting the
notion that such a role would be the province of an institutional press. Id. at 536.
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11

landscape.
When public officials seek judicial validation of the
punishment of their critics, they attempt to resurrect a seditious libel
regime and strike at the heart of the First Amendment. In his
profoundly influential explorations of the theoretical underpinnings
of First Amendment doctrine, Harry Kalven observed that, “despite
12
its obvious centrality,” the concept of seditious libel had been
perplexingly neglected as a reference point in the articulation of free
13
speech principles until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In Sullivan,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the concept’s utility in framing the
analysis how free speech would be threatened if those criticizing
public officials faced crushing defamation liability without proof of
14
actual malice. The Court stressed the constitutional imperative to
protect the “citizen-critic,” writing “[i]t is as much [the citizen’s]
15
duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.”
The
“constitutional shield” bestowed on critics of official conduct
16
embodied the “central meaning of the First Amendment.”
Kalven identified the punishment of the offense of seditious libel as
17
Such regimes, Kalven
the “hallmark of all closed societies.”
explained, apprehend the dangerous power of criticism to
undermine public confidence in, and allegiance to, current leaders
18
and their policies. The treatment of this kind of criticism represents
19
“the true pragmatic test of freedom of speech.” A government’s
response to such speech reveals whether or not the speaker lives in a
free society; “it is a profound tenet of democracy that no government

11. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) (describing
political speech as “at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to
protect”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1984)
(characterizing political speech as “entitled to the most exacting degree of First
Amendment protection”); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) (explaining that the First Amendment “‘was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
12. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19 (1965).
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Id. (holding that, to ensure adequate protection of speech and press
freedom, a public official could not recover damages in defamation suit relating to
performance of governmental duties unless the official could show allegedly
defamatory statement was made or published with actual malice or with reckless
disregard of statement’s truth or falsity).
15. Id. at 282.
16. Id. at 273. In his iconic dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919),
Justice Holmes concluded that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Sedition Act of
1798, the First Amendment could not have “left the common law as to seditious libel
in force.” Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. KALVEN, JR., supra note 12, at 15.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 16.
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official has the legal power to silence such commentary about
20
himself.”
The protection of dissent also serves other structural purposes.
Respect for social critics ensures that minorities participate in self21
governance, incorporating potentially alienated outsiders into the
body politic and diversifying the knowledge base for public decisionmaking. Such participation enhances the perceived legitimacy of
22
government action, contributing to the maintenance of social
23
peace, and improving the durability of citizens’ ties to their
24
community. By resisting the reflex to regard the citizen critic as an
enemy and remaining open to the possibility that criticism may
25
demonstrate loyalty and concern, a social institution reveals its
fundamental commitments.
Further, by protecting dissent that expresses what is perceived as
a minority perspective, a society invites the presentation of an
authentic self and the reconsideration of claimed identities and
alliances. A society receptive to dissent promotes “engaged
26
association” as the dissenter “seek[s] converts and colleagues.”
By protecting dissent a community demonstrates its respect for
individual autonomy, allowing a person to explain her vision of
27
“the life she endorses” and to commend that vision of an ideal
life to others as an invitation for them to join her in its
28
collaborative construction.

20. Id. at 15.
21. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1774 (2005).
22. Id. at 1775 (drawing on works of Stephen Carter, Steven Shiffrin, and Lee
Bollinger).
23. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (arguing that repression of expression “menaces stable government”).
24. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDIATION ON LAW,
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 97 (1998) (“[T]he justice of a state is not measured merely by
its authority’s tolerance for dissent, but also by its dissenters’ tolerance for
authority.”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA
18 (1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE] (describing dissent as “a form of
cultural glue that binds citizens to the political community”); Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 885 (1963) (noting
“persons who have had full freedom to state their position and to persuade others to
adopt it will . . . be more ready to accept the common judgment”).
25. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has observed that “critique can also be a form of
commitment, a means of laying a claim. It’s the ultimate gesture of citizenship. A
way of saying: I’m not just passing through, I live here.” Henry Louis Gates, Jr., On
Patriotism, NATION, July 15/22, 1991, at 91.
26. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 91
(1990) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE].
27. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253
(2011).
28. Id. at 266–67.
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As Cass Sunstein has noted in Why Societies Need Dissent, “even when
minorities do not affect people’s publicly expressed views, they often
29
have an impact on what people think privately,” building the
collective energy to dislodge outmoded, unfounded, or unjust habits
of thought.
Sunstein urges vigilance in the creation and
maintenance of such an expressive environment, writing:
A well-functioning democracy has a culture of free speech, not
simply legal protection of free speech.
It encourages
independence of mind. It imparts a willingness to challenge
prevailing opinion through both words and deeds. Equally
important, it encourages a certain set of attitudes in listeners, one
that gives a respectful hearing to those who do not embrace the
conventional wisdom. In a culture of free speech, the attitude of
30
listeners is no less important than that of speakers.

To describe the cultural ecology most conducive to the
advancement of First Amendment objectives, the enforcement of
governmental accountability, and the promotion of individual
flourishing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly identified an
imperative for the preservation of “breathing space” for even the
31
most intemperate, offensive, or controversial speakers. The First
Amendment’s protection of dissent potentially conditions listeners
and speakers to adopt useful attitudes, promoting tolerance and
encouraging citizens to exercise self-restraint when tempted to stifle
32
persons with jarring, unfamiliar, strident, or even hateful views.
Dissent will not always challenge the commonly held convictions of
the governed. Instead it may seek to end the enforcement of the
preferences of the dominant, preferences that may be at odds with
the common good or the good of an unjustly disempowered
constituency that may in fact be a demographic majority. The
dissenter may press for the end of an oppressive regime that falsely
projects an image of unanimity of interest and ideology. Thus, the
protection of dissent advances a project at the center of our
29. SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (drawing on research presented in ROBERT S.
BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION 79–80 (1992)).
30. Id. at 110 (emphasis omitted); see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 247 (1986) (describing
free speech as “concerned with the development of a mind that is itself comfortable
with uncertainty and complexity”).
31. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (“[I]n public debate . . . [we]
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive . . . .”).
32. See BOLLINGER, supra note 30, at 9–10 (suggesting that society is strengthened
when its members cultivate tolerance for differing viewpoints).
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constitutional aspirations—the elimination of injustice. Steven
Shiffrin argues that the dissenter can make an especially
indispensable social and political contribution by “challenging unjust
33
hierarchies” and advocating responsive change. Therefore, Shiffrin
asserts, “[f]ree speech theory should be taken beyond protecting or
tolerating dissent: The First Amendment should be taken to reflect a
34
constitutional commitment to promoting dissent.”
Drawing on the rhetoric of the iconic Brandeis concurrence in
35
Whitney v. California, Vincent Blasi discerns a related aspiration
within a First Amendment tradition that offers ample shelter to
dissenters: the cultivation of the virtue of civic courage among our
36
citizens. Brandeis ascribed to the Framers a distinct vision of the
civic life, stating that they “valued liberty both as an end and as a
37
means.” Brandeis went on to assert that the surest means to achieve
enduring social stability was to protect the opportunity to discuss
38
grievances and remedies.
Within this paradigm, “the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people,” and “public discussion is a
39
political duty.” To facilitate citizens’ truth-seeking and truth-telling,
Brandeis argued, government had to nurture relevant human
capabilities, arguing that “[t]hose who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative
40
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.” Thus, Blasi concludes the
33. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 24, at xii. As Shiffrin has perceptively
detected, our constitutional culture reveals America’s complicated relationship with
actual dissent and dissenters:
[T]he First Amendment serves to undermine dissent even as it protects it.
Of course, the First Amendment protects dissent. It offers a legal claim for
dissenters, and it functions as a cultural symbol encouraging dissenters to
speak out. Nonetheless, the symbolism of the First Amendment perpetuates
a cultural myth. It functions as a form of cultural ideology through which
the society secures allegiance. It leads us to believe that America is the land
of free speech, but it blinks at the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling,” and it masks the extent to which free speech is marginalized,
discouraged, and repressed.
Id. at 26–27.
34. Id. at 91.
35. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
36. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 696–97 (1988)
[hereinafter Blasi, First Amendment]; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374–80 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
37. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 375–76 (“Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, [the Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force
in its worst form.”).
39. Id. at 375.
40. Id.
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following: “Brandeis valued a strong doctrine of free speech largely
for its contribution to the character of the political community,
particularly the character of those who possess the power to
41
regulate.” If government hopes to nurture civic courage among its
people, government officials should not respond to criticism of their
performance or policies by displaying the fear that is frequently
masked by repression.
Seana Shiffrin has recently proposed placing the “free thinker” at
42
the center of free speech theory. Shiffrin persuasively suggests that
adopting a thinker-based perspective illuminates the normative
foundation for the constitutional protection of speech and locates
the project of discerning First Amendment free speech principles
43
within a larger political theory framework. Shiffrin connects the
protection of freedom of speech to a democratic vision of citizens as
“functional thinkers and moral agents” and argues that a
government “cannot retain its legitimacy while undermining the
conditions necessary for the development and exercise of each
44
member’s capacities for free thought.” To respect the individual’s
“interest in the protection of the free development and operation of
her mind,” free speech theory must, in Shiffrin’s view, address how
laws, regulations, and other governmental practices interfere with or
45
frustrate that interest. To apprehend and counteract such injuries,
free speech theory must also reinforce an appreciation of the
spectrum of capabilities and opportunities the thinker’s interest
encompasses. For Shiffrin, that spectrum includes “[a] capacity for
practical and theoretical thought,” for “[a]pprehending the true,”
46
and for “[e]xercising the imagination.” To be a thinker a person
must also cultivate the “intellectual prerequisites of moral relations”
by acquiring knowledge of others and of the environments shared
47
with them. Free speech allows this developmental process to take
place. Communication offers access to what others know and
understand and facilitates the adoption of others’ perspectives in the
midst of dispute or conflict. It also creates an opportunity for the
individual to be known, understood, and respected, despite

41. Blasi, First Amendment, supra note 36, at 679–80.
42. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 283 (2011) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Thinker-Based Approach].
43. Id. at 284.
44. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 417–18
(2011).
45. Shiffrin, Thinker-Based Approach, supra note 42, at 287.
46. Id. at 289.
47. Id. at 291.
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48

difference.
Such experience and exchange, Shiffrin posits, are
critical if citizens are to develop the “strong and independent
capacities for thought and judgment” that are the prerequisites for
49
successful and meaningful democratic governance.
Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to First Amendment analysis
illuminates the link between the acquisition of critical thinking
capabilities through expressive experience and the successful
performance of the responsibilities of citizenship.
Although
Shiffrin’s work does not specifically consider public schools as a site
of dissent, her insights can provide ammunition to discredit schools’
arguments that restrictive reactions to student dissent are necessary to
achieve essential instructional objectives.
Amy Gutmann has
described the central objective of citizenship education as teaching
children “not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think
critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal
50
of sharing political sovereignty as citizens.”
As an institution
51
charged with cultivating students’ “civic disposition[],” schools must
not be allowed to exempt themselves from being a target upon which
students may train their critical thinking skills.
One particularly valuable mechanism for student practice of the
skills of engaged citizenship is the exercise of the right to petition for
redress of grievances. Regrettably, this pointed and valuable medium
of dissent addressed to the government and its representatives has
become increasingly marginalized in constitutional theory and
52
precedent, a phenomenon that has drawn mounting criticism.
48. Id. at 292.
49. Id. at 294–95.
50. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 51 (1987); see also Rebecca L. Brown,
Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 180 (1993) (describing mature citizens as
having developed “a certain degree of autonomy and capacity for independent
judgment while still appreciating the value to be gained from wisdom and
experiences of prior generations”); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work
of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1991) (calling for
vigilant protection of student speech in light of role free expression can play in
enhancing students’ “knowledge, intellect, and capacity for rational deliberation”);
Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
131, 188 (1995) (recommending that “a citizen needs to be able both to understand
and internalize the norms of her society and to judge those norms against rational
attack”).
51. See CAMPAIGN FOR THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHS., NO EXCUSES: ELEVEN SCHOOLS
AND DISTRICTS THAT MAKE PREPARING STUDENTS FOR CITIZENSHIP A PRIORITY, AND HOW
OTHERS CAN DO IT, TOO 19 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/LabReport_Booklet_August_2010.authcheckdam.pd
f (encouraging schools to embrace mission of cultivating students’ civic learning and
civic participation).
52. E.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE:
SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE ” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT
FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES (2012) (arguing for revitalized protection of varied
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Calling for a re-examination of the constitutional status conferred on
the petition right by the First Amendment, Ronald Krotoszynski has
argued that the Petition Clause must at least afford citizens
53
“meaningful access” to government officials.
Protection for petitioning as a means of registering a citizen’s
concern emerged from an Anglo-American tradition that embraced
“a personal right to bring complaints about public policy directly to
the officers of government, up to and including the king himself, and
54
to receive some sort of response.” During the early years of the
American federal government, petitioning functioned as an effective
55
complement to voting in making known the views of the citizenry,
and the drafting of the First Amendment signals the intent to embed
a governmental duty to consider the grievances of the governed,
56
including maladministration and corruption. In both its historically
distant and more recent forms, the petitioner’s encounter with those
wielding governmental power could spur public debate, effect actual

forms of petitioning); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2504
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (questioning the majority’s
dismissive treatment of the claim that specific enumeration of the petition right in
First Amendment text denoted entitlements distinct from the protection of other
forms of speech). The Duryea majority’s reading tracks rulings such as McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), which concludes that the Petition Clause has no
independent meaning and conveys only the protection owed free speech generally.
Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2495; see also McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
53. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 17. See generally Julie M. Spanbauer, The
First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a
Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993) (examining the historical origins
of the right to petition and its distinct role in regime of free expression). In
response to the role public protests have played in pricking the public conscience
and spurring needed reforms, Krotoszynski adds that enforcement of a properly
articulated petition right would preserve access to both an official and a public
audience so that the dissenting citizen can contribute to the process of public
deliberation. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 17, 51; see also Carol Rice Andrews,
A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the
Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 624 (1999) (noting that the right’s distinct character
stems from the special values it serves, “giv[ing] citizens a sense of participation”
while “help[ing] to keep the government better informed”).
54. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 6. Even during the operation of the
Sedition Act of 1798, petitioning of Congress was exempted from punishment. Id.
In the early years of the American Republic, the right to petition was seen as selfevident and uncontroversial. Id. at 109–10.
55. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 25 (2004).
56. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition
Government for Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142–43, 154 (1986).
Ironically, the petition right’s potential to “expose public oppressions, ”
dramatized in the congressional petitioning campaigns of abolitionists in the
nineteenth century, spawned resistance to its use —resistance formalized in socalled gag rules adopted to bar the introduction of anti-slavery petitions in the
pre-Civil War Congress. Id. at 154, 158–65.
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change, and reinforce the foundation of accountability essential to
57
self-government.
Even if one unwisely accepts the characterization of petitioning as
“an imperfect form of democratic politics necessary only in times and
58
places where universal suffrage does not exist,” the importance of
this instrument of communication for a constituency like children
and youth who cannot yet vote can be readily appreciated. However,
as will be considered in Part III below, the instrumental value and the
constitutional significance of student petitioning and the airing of
grievances about school in school, have been slighted by both
educators and judges.
In First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have recognized dissent,
conceived most fundamentally as the presentation of concerns and
complaints about the functioning of government, as a core
prerogative of citizenship.
How public schools — institutions
commissioned to help children understand and undertake their civic
responsibilities—respond to dissent will shape student expectations
about the content of their constitutional rights and roles as citizens.
When responding to dissent, schools would ideally nourish and
invigorate students’ expressive and analytical capabilities.
Unfortunately, however, school officials have often overlooked the
learning opportunities that student dissent creates, and courts have
not consistently weighed those opportunities when balancing the
interests in student speech cases.
II. STUDENT SPEAKERS AND THE CONTESTED CONTENT OF AN
EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP
Within First Amendment scholarship, the analysis of how schools
could actively promote free speech values by developing children’s
59
capacities as speakers remains an oddly neglected topic. Far more
57. See KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 13 (drawing on Alexander
Meikeljohn’s argument that democratic self-government requires an engaged
citizenry).
58. Id. at ix. Mass petitioning by suffragists prior to ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment illustrates the significance of this form of political action for the
disenfranchised. Id. at 122. See generally SUSAN ZAESKE, SIGNATURES OF CITIZENSHIP:
PETITIONING, ANTISLAVERY, & WOMEN’S POLITICAL IDENTITY (2003) (emphasizing the
importance of women anti-slavery petitioners in the abolition movement).
59. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 860
(2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA (1999)). Solum praises Shiffrin’s work for moving beyond conventional
court-centered accounts to examine the role played by schools and media in
advancing free speech values. Id. But see S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three
Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV.
119 (1995) (critiquing schools’ hostility to student expression); Abby Marie Mollen,
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common are examinations of how far free speech principles must, in
the authors’ view, be modified to scale back students’ speech rights at
60
school. This trajectory within First Amendment scholarship tracks
the path frequently taken by the Supreme Court in its interpretation
61
of the constitutional rights of children.
Examining this pattern
across several decisional domains, Emily Buss has adeptly chronicled
the Supreme Court’s problematic tendency to define children’s
constitutional rights by “whittl[ing] down” adult rights into a
shrunken form, calculating the content of children’s entitlements by
62
“sloppily discount[ing]” formulas applied to adult claims.
This
“adult-minus orientation,” Buss persuasively argues, prevents the
Court from responding to children’s differences in the application of
63
foundational constitutional principles.
As Buss has elaborated,
faithful translation of how relevant principles should apply to
children might require adapting the constitutional standard to
impose greater or significantly different obligations on public
64
officials. Mindful of the imprint their response to student-critics will
leave on the constitutional consciousness of their pupils, educators
must calibrate their response to conform to a kind of precautionary
principle, acknowledging that “[c]hildren are unlikely to internalize
the value of the civic virtues of participation and tolerance if their
65
schools appear to systematically trivialize and ignore such virtues.”
Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 1501 (2008) (arguing that courts should insist on a showing of actual
educational harm before validating school policies that restrict student speech).
60. See, e.g., ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (2009) [hereinafter DUPRE, SPEAKING UP] (arguing that
Tinker adversely affected the student-educator relationship by undermining respect
for authority); Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing
Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 717 (2009) (rejecting the premise that students’ speech rights are
insufficiently protected at school and proposing that school-sponsored activities
should be treated as a “nonforum” with regulation of student speech therein not
subject to judicial review under the Free Speech Clause); R. George Wright, Tinker
and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist Alternative, 41 IND. L. REV. 105 (2008)
(recommending that school officials be granted more leeway to restrict student
speech in order to minimize distractions from instruction).
61. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
355, 355.
62. Id. at 355, 364.
63. Id. at 355.
64. Id. at 356.
65. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 85 (1990) (advising that
“[p]ublic schools, therefore, not only must intone the rhetoric of free speech, they
must act and structure themselves to give credibility to their statements”); cf. Betsy
Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1654 (1986) (observing that if
constitutional constraints are not stringently applied to school officials, “students will
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When asked to apply constitutional guarantees in the public school
context, members of the Supreme Court have repeatedly offered lofty
descriptions of the public school’s role in cultivating a child’s
understanding of constitutional citizenship. In Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court described public education as “the very
foundation of good citizenship,” and as “a principal instrument in
66
67
awakening the child to cultural values.” In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court endorsed the state’s articulated objectives for its system of
compulsory education: preparing citizens “to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system” and “to be self-reliant
68
69
and self-sufficient participants in society.” In Ambach v. Norwick,
the Court again stressed public schools’ importance in preparing
70
students for active citizenship and in transmitting “the values on
71
The Court described the state’s public
which our society rests.”
school curriculum as constructed to “promote[] the development of
the understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent participation in
72
the democratic process.” The Ambach Court underscored teachers’
influence on “the attitudes of students toward government, the
political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities,” exerting an
influence deemed “crucial to the continued good health of a
73
74
democracy.” In Plyler v. Doe, the Court again embraced a vision of
America’s public school system as “‘a most vital civic institution for
75
the preservation of a democratic system of government.’”
These consistent affirmations of public schools’ civic importance
camouflage fundamental disagreements about the content of an
not come to an understanding of the value of a democratic, participatory society, but
instead will become a passive, alienated citizenry that believes that government is
arbitrary”).
66. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (noting the repeated affirmation of “an
abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society . . . in numerous
opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided”).
67. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
68. Id. at 221.
69. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
70. Id. at 76.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 78 n.8.
73. Id. at 79. The Ambach Court relied on then-recent social science literature as
confirming the important function of schools in “inculcating fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.” Id. at 77 (citing
RICHARD E. DAWSON ET AL., POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 146–67 (2d ed. 1969); ROBERT
HESS & JUDITH TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 114,
158–71, 217–20 (1967); V. O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
323–43 (1961)).
74. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
75. Id. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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education for citizenship. Since the creation of an American public
school system, two starkly different visions of the mission of public
education have vied for dominance. In the social reproduction
model, schools “inculcate students with society’s traditions and
values,” equipping students to take part in democratic institutions,
76
but aiming to preserve existing norms and practices. In contrast,
the social reconstruction model casts the school as “a lever of social
77
change” oriented toward reform of the status quo. Both models
place education for citizenship on schools’ instructional agenda, but
their prescriptions for how to deliver that education diverge sharply.
A battle over educational methodology is intertwined with the
debate about whether schools should facilitate the replication or the
revision of social traditions. As adroitly described by Stephen
Goldstein, the more traditional prescriptive instructional model
delivers “information and accepted truths” to a “passive, absorbent
78
student.”
In contrast, under an analytic instructional regime,
students and teachers scrutinize data and values “as active
79
Although versions of the
participants in the search for truth.”
prescriptive model may be regarded as the customary practice in
American elementary and secondary schools, educational leaders,
such as John Dewey, have long stressed that an effective education
creates academic and civic proficiency by providing participatory
80
experiences.
However, many educators and legal scholars question whether
public school students can acquire essential academic knowledge if
81
order and obedience are not stringently enforced. Establishing the
requisite ordered atmosphere could require significant curtailment
of student expression, but adherents of an obedience-oriented
76. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order
in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 53 (1996).
77. Id. at 65 n.115 (quoting LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876–1957, at 118 (1961))
(examining progressive educational philosophy of John Dewey).
78. Stephen Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970).
79. Id.
80. See generally LAUREL N. TANNER, DEWEY’S LABORATORY SCHOOL: LESSONS FOR
TODAY (1997) (describing Dewey’s campaign for the delivery of an active,
participatory educational experience in public schools).
81. See, e.g., DUPRE, SPEAKING UP, supra note 60, at 10, 258 (asserting that lack of
order makes delivery of “serious education” impossible and linking disorder to
misguided judicial intervention in schools precipitated by exaggerated student claims
of rights); Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 605, 619 (stating that “only by submitting to the authoritative direction of
teachers [can] young people learn the skills, attitudes, and understandings without
which they cannot successfully sustain the operation of a democratic society”).
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method argue such restrictions would result in little loss of real
82
Instead, the restrictions imposed in a strict school
value.
environment guide a child toward maturity and engrain the habits of
83
self-control expected of a responsible citizen.
In the First Amendment context, we can gain a vital perspective on
the kind of citizenship education public schools offer by examining
how freely students may speak at school and, in particular, how
officials react when students criticize school policies and personnel.
Evaluations of the scope of school officials’ authority to regulate or
restrict student speech inevitably focus on a familiar quartet of
Supreme Court rulings: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
84
85
School District, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School
86
87
District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick. However, an inquiry into
the nature of schools’ First Amendment duties toward the dissident
student speaker properly begins with West Virginia State Board of
88
Education v. Barnette. In Barnette, a child was expelled from school
for refusing to participate in the daily flag salute ritual mandated by
89
state law. That refusal, rooted in the religious beliefs of the child
and her parents as Jehovah’s Witnesses, can be readily understood as
a protest against school officials’ unconstitutional demand to recite a
90
formulaic affirmation of loyalty to the United States. Concluding
that the state lacked constitutional authority to punish the objecting
child for a “failure to conform” to such governmental demand,

82. See Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 666 (1987) (“[I]f free
speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must have something worth saying, together
with the maturity and the skill needed to say it.”).
83. Justice Powell was a proponent of this view. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The primary duty of school officials and
teachers . . . is the education and training of young people . . . . Without first
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This understanding is
no less important than learning to read and write. One who does not comprehend
the meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education
but throughout his subsequent life.”).
84. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
85. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
86. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
87. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
88. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
89. Id. at 629. The child’s refusal to participate in the flag salute was treated as
insubordination, triggering the child’s expulsion. Id. Deemed “unlawfully absent”
as a result, the child faced delinquency proceedings and his parents could be
prosecuted for causing such delinquency. Id.
90. See id. at 629–30 (explaining why Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs prompted their
refusal to salute the flag).
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Justice Jackson emphatically rejected the state’s assertion that the
enforcement of such a constitutional limit would dangerously weaken
91
the government’s authority as an educator. Justice Jackson wrote as
follows: “That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
92
mere platitudes.”
Justice Jackson went on to stress that daily school practices should
93
not be shaped by a fear of intellectual or spiritual diversity. School
life should not project “an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds,” but should instead reflect that “[w]e can
have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that
we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional
94
Charged with both
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.”
developing the talents of its students and communicating the
demands of essential constitutional values, school officials had to
acknowledge that they could not “invade[] the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
95
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”
In vindicating the child’s challenge to the pledge requirement, the
Barnette Court clarified that it was the school’s response, not the
child’s request, that hampered the delivery of an education in the
96
nature of constitutional citizenship.
The objecting child had
actually created an opportunity to affirm a critical constitutional
tenet: “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
97
the existing order.”
The Supreme Court again embraced the student dissenter in
98
Tinker. In December 1965, siblings Mary Beth and John Tinker, as
well as Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to school in
99
opposition to the Vietnam War. The students were suspended based
on a policy that had been hastily adopted only days before at a district

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 629.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 641–42.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 642.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
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principals’ meeting, convened to address reports of student plans to
100
Under the policy,
protest against the Vietnam War at school.
students wearing an armband at school would be suspended if they
101
refused to remove it. A memorandum prepared after the students’
suspension alluded to concerns about how friends of a former high
school student killed in Vietnam might react to the armbands and
reports of other students’ plans to wear armbands of different
102
colors.
Trial testimony from school officials, however, indicated
that the main impetus for the “no armband” rule was not
apprehension about how the black armbands could disrupt school
103
activities or spawn student altercations. Instead, the officials acted
because they believed “‘the schools are no place for demonstrations,’
and if the students ‘didn’t like the way our elected officials were
handling things, it should be handled with the ballot box and not in
104
the halls of our public schools.’”
The Supreme Court’s exploration of how the First Amendment’s
free speech guarantees applied to student speakers in public school
proceeded from two premises: (1) students did not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate;” and (2) those rights would be “applied in light of
105
the special characteristics of the school environment.”
With their
“witness of the armbands,” the Tinker siblings and Christopher
Eckhardt sought to make their views public and persuade others to
106
adopt them.
Although the armbands prompted discussion both
inside and outside their classrooms, they did not create any
107
disorder.
Characterizing the wearing of armbands as symbolic
expression, “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” Justice Fortas, writing for
the majority, underscored that the students’ expression had been
108
“entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct.”
This emphasis signaled what would become the Court’s central
100. Id. at 510.
101. Id. at 504.
102. Id. at 509 n.3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 506.
106. Id. at 514.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 505. By highlighting that the evidence in the case showed “no
aggressive, disruptive action,” the majority opinion aligned Tinker’s factual record
with that of Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), which provided the
template for the Tinker standard and distinguished it from events set forth in
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). For an
insightful examination of how these Fifth Circuit cases laid Tinker’s foundation, see
Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1129 (2009).
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concern as it balanced student speech rights with schools’ recognized
“comprehensive authority” to “prescribe and control” student
109
conduct.
Foreshadowing the standard he would articulate in Tinker, Justice
Fortas offered a robust defense of the value of student dissent in his
book, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, published the year
110
Tinker was argued.
In the slim volume’s second chapter, “The
Simplicities: The Right to Dissent and Its Limitations,” Fortas
observed the following: “[U]nder our Constitution, the question is
111
not ‘may I dissent?’ or ‘may I oppose a law or a government?’”
Fortas took young protesters’ demands to participate in political
debate seriously and rejected portrayals of youth as either disengaged
or petulantly rebellious, instead associating their activities with a
112
“count me in” spirit. Praising the constructive ambitions of “youth
revolt,” Fortas welcomed the opportunity such protest created “to
reappraise the distribution of function and responsibility among the
113
generations.”
Fortas argued that America’s older generation had a
responsibility to guide young dissidents away from intemperate tactics
that ignored the rights and needs of others and advised that
“moderation, consideration, and sympathetic understanding” should
114
be the hallmark of any response to youth protest. Fortas took care
to confine the possible basis for imposing restrictions on youths’
expressive activities to a governmental duty to reconcile competing
interests in a shared public space and to prevent harms that might be
115
inflicted on other citizens in the absence of regulation.
This duty
does not emanate from officials’ defensive inclination to insulate
themselves from criticism or challenge but only from government’s
obligations to protect citizens.
Tinker affirmed that school officials must have the authority to
restrict speech that disrupts school operations or intrudes on other
116
students’ rights.
Such authority, however, did not extend to
discipline based on “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
117
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
109. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
110. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 17 (1968).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 71–72 (presenting “a youth reflection,” which asked, “[s]ince inside of
Me there is a Person, why should he not share in the shaping of my life and of the
world in which I live”).
113. Id. at 79.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21.
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
117. Id. at 509.
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Echoing Barnette’s call for special vigilance in protecting
constitutional rights in the institutions charged with “educating the
118
young for citizenship,” Justice Fortas invoked the specter of public
schools becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism” in which students
would become “closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate . . . confined to the expression of those
119
sentiments that are officially approved.”
Tinker prescribed that school officials could prohibit student
expression only when they had “reason to anticipate” that the speech
“would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
120
upon the rights of other students.”
They could not suppress
121
“expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.”
Only by adhering to carefully calibrated limits on their authority to
silence students could schools match the Constitution’s expectations
for citizenship education:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk . . . . [I]t is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
122
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.

Justice Black, in his dissent in Tinker, saw more danger than
opportunity in student dissent. Black reframed the issues in Tinker as
whether students should be allowed to use schools as “platforms for
the exercise of free speech” and questioned whether courts should
123
wade into debates about daily school operations.
To Black,
protecting the armband-wearers threatened to “subject[] all the
public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their
124
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students.”
Extending such protection would inhibit schools’ ability to impose
discipline, which, Black insisted, is “an integral and important part of
125
training our children to be good citizens.”
Fuming that public
school students were not “sent to the schools at public expense to
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 507.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 524.
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broadcast political or any other views to educate and inform the
public,” Black rejected the Tinker majority’s projected vision of a
126
Instead, he emphasized that children
constitutional education
127
should be in school to learn, not to teach.
The imperatives underlying Barnette and Tinker became more
128
High school
muffled in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.
student Matthew Fraser had given a speech at a mandatory assembly
129
as part of an educational program in self-government.
To
nominate a friend for student body vice-president, Fraser offered a
series of sophomoric sexual innuendos which the student audience
greeted with reactions ranging from hoots and simulations of sex
130
positions to bewilderment or discomfort.
Before the assembly
Fraser had shown the text of his remarks to two teachers who warned
him that presenting this kind of “inappropriate” content could lead
131
to “severe” disciplinary consequences.
After Fraser’s speech,
several teachers complained to the assistant principal and she
concluded Fraser’s remarks had violated the school disciplinary code:
“Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene,
132
profane language or gestures.”
After giving Fraser a chance to
address the allegations, the assistant principal imposed two
punishments: three days of suspension and the removal of Fraser’s
133
name from the list of commencement speaker candidates.
134
135
Over the dissents of only Justices Marshall and Stevens, the
Supreme Court emphatically validated the school’s disciplinary
136
response.
Stressing “the marked distinction” between the Tinker
armbands’ “nondisruptive, passive expression of a political
viewpoint” and the sexual content of Fraser’s remarks, Chief Justice
126. Id. at 522.
127. See id. (“The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned
as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.”).
128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
129. Id. at 678.
130. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (providing excerpts from Fraser’s
speech).
131. Id. at 678 (majority opinion).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 690–91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district failed to
show educational disruption as required by Tinker).
135. See id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that because the disciplinary
code had not given Fraser fair notice that “offensive” speech would be sanctioned,
he had been denied due process).
136. See id. at 686–87 (majority opinion) (reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision).
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Burger’s majority opinion disdainfully described the Ninth Circuit’s
contrary ruling as mistakenly equating “the use of lewd and obscene
speech in order to make what the speaker considered to be a point in
a nominating speech for a fellow student” with the wearing of an
armband “as a form of protest or the expression of a political
137
position.”
Revealingly, Chief Justice Burger anchored his analysis in historians
Charles and Mary Beard’s description of how public schools should
prepare students for citizenship: “It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness
and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
138
community and the nation.”
In the Fraser Court’s view, public
schools must transmit a range of values “necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system.” These values include
both “tolerance of divergent political and religious views” and an
139
appreciation of the “sensibilities of others,” and consequently
“disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly
140
Schools must balance the students’
threatening to others.”
freedom to take unpopular positions in schools with the need to
141
teach students the limits of socially appropriate behavior.
142
Expected to “teach by example,” school officials disciplined
Fraser in order to communicate that “vulgar speech and lewd
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental values of public
143
school education.” Any other response would, Chief Justice Burger
warned, signal that the specter presented in Justice Black’s Tinker
dissent had come to pass—teachers and administrators
144
“surrender[ing] control” of American schools to the students.
Perhaps alarmed by Chief Justice Burger’s sympathetic invocation of
the authoritarian sentiments of Justice Black’s Tinker dissent, Justice
Brennan concurred but wrote separately to stress that the Fraser result
should be seen simply as an application of Tinker’s disruption

137. Id. at 680.
138. Id. at 681 (citing CHARLES A. BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 683. The Court noted that such standards of decorum are not unique
to public schools, citing parliamentary rules of the U.S. House that proscribe the use
of “indecent language” and Senate debate rules that forbid “offensive” references to
any state or the imputation of “improper motives” to another Senator. Id. at 682.
141. Id. at 681.
142. Id. at 683.
143. Id. at 685–86.
144. Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
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standard and not as an enlargement of the scope of the school’s
145
authority to limit student speech.
The Fraser Court’s vindication of school administrators’ disciplinary
action suggested an emergent shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, away
from the sympathetic embrace of student dissenters presented in
Justice Fortas’s Tinker majority opinion and toward the more
restrictive vision of Justice Black’s Tinker dissent. Fraser could,
however, plausibly be read to uphold school officials’ authority to
impose discipline in order to modulate the manner in which students
conducted their political exchanges while not endorsing the broader
suppression of critical or controversial speech. Unfortunately,
subsequent cases did not appear to subscribe to this interpretation of
Fraser.
Two years later, the Supreme Court examined the nature of
students’ expressive freedom when it considered the scope of school
administrators’ authority to censor the speech of high school
journalism students writing in the school newspaper in Hazelwood
146
School District v. Kuhlmeier. Prepared in a journalism class, the paper
was produced with school district funds and equipment and was
147
distributed within the school and to the surrounding community.
In late April 1983, the Journalism II teacher appears to have left
precipitously to take a new job, and another teacher temporarily
stepped in to oversee the preparation of the paper’s last edition of
that school year. When the principal reviewed the final edition
148
proofs, he objected to two stories and ordered that they be excised.
One story examined the pregnancies of three girls who attended the
149
school. The other recounted how students had been affected when
their parents divorced and included a named student complaining in
some detail about what she perceived as her father’s bad behavior as
150
a spouse and parent.
The principal did not believe that the teen
pregnancy story had taken sufficient care to shield the students’
identities and also worried that the frank discussions of teen sex and
birth control might be unsuitable for both younger students at the
145. Id. at 687–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
147. Id. at 262. The students working on the paper received course credit and
were supervised by a teacher. Id. at 268. Page proofs of each edition had to be
submitted to the principal for review prior to publication. Id. at 269.
148. Id. at 263–64. The stories that concerned the principal appeared with other
articles on two pages of the newspaper, and, to expedite production of the paper, the
last edition before the end of the school year, the principal decided to delete the
complete pages rather than only the two stories.
149. See id. at 263.
150. See id.
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school and students’ younger siblings who would have access to the
151
The principal also feared the
paper when it was brought home.
divorce story intruded too far into the families’ private lives and was
particularly concerned about the student authors’ failure to consult
the spotlighted parents to verify the accuracy of their children’s
accounts or to ascertain if they had concerns about the story’s
152
impact.
Several members of the newspaper staff challenged the principal’s
mandate to remove the articles, asserting that their First Amendment
153
rights had been violated. The students lost in federal district court
but prevailed in the Eighth Circuit. The appellate court accepted the
students’ claim that the paper served as a public forum and ruled that
school officials could control the content of speech presented in such
a forum only when, as in Tinker, such action was “necessary to avoid
material and substantial interference with school work or
154
discipline . . . or the rights of others.”
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the “public forum”
designation for the paper, finding that neither the school’s past
practices nor the terms of relevant policies reflected an intent to
relinquish control over the paper as a supervised, curricular learning
experience. Instead, school officials had retained authority to
155
regulate the paper.
The Court stressed the significance of the
difference between the speech in the excised articles and “a student’s
personal expression that happens to occur on school premises,”
156
which had been wrongly suppressed in Tinker.
Accepting
educators’ concern that the public might perceive that material
157
published in a school paper bore “the imprimatur of the school,”
the Hazelwood Court linked to the need to ensure that supervised
activities served curricular objectives, “impart[ing] particular
158
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.” School
officials could regulate speech in these school-sponsored venues “to
assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed

151. Id. at 263–64.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 264.
154. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)),
rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
155. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. The Court found students’ assertions that they
believed that they could publish “practically anything” unsupported by school
officials’ past course of conduct or the text of cited policies. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 271.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 271.
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to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
159
school.”
The school needed the ability to disassociate itself from speech that
would be “disseminated under its auspices” but that would not meet
the standards the school enforced to achieve its instructional
160
objectives. In addition, consistent with their overarching custodial
and instructional responsibilities, school officials “must be able to
take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially
161
sensitive topics,” and can “refuse to sponsor student speech that
might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared
values of a civilized social order,’ . . . or to associate the school with
any position other than neutrality on matters of political
162
controversy.”
The Hazelwood majority therefore concluded that
Tinker’s standard did not apply when a school exercised control over
163
student expression in school-sponsored expressive activities.
In
such circumstances, school officials acted constitutionally as long as
their decisions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
164
concerns.”
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Marshall, sharply attacked what he saw as the majority’s
abandonment of Tinker’s vigilant concern for students’ expressive
165
rights.
To Brennan, the majority’s new approach to what was
deemed “school-sponsored” student expression handed school
159. Id. at 271–72. This kind of problematic speech included written work that
was “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id.
160. See id. (explaining that the school needed the ability to disassociate itself
from speech that would be “disseminated under its auspices” but that would not
meet the standards the school enforced to achieve its instructional objectives).
161. Id. at 272.
162. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Hazelwood majority’s allusion to the need
for a school to maintain a position of “neutrality on matters of political controversy”
has not received much specific attention, but this formulation could be invoked by
school officials to justify some disturbing conclusions. See Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist.,
Agreement Reached on Harassment Lawsuit, ANOKA-HENNEPIN NEWSROOM (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.anoka.k12.mn.us/education/components/whatsnew/default.php?section
detailid=233754&itemID=48062 (describing signing of consent decree in which
Minnesota school district agreed to abandon “neutrality” policy that had been
interpreted to bar teachers from intervening when LGBT students were subjected to
harassment).
163. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73.
164. Id. at 273.
165. Id. at 282–83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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administrators a menu of broadly worded excuses for censorship,
effectively allowing them to “camouflage viewpoint discrimination as
167
the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.” To Justice
Brennan, the majority’s approach threatened to undermine both
students’ expressive freedom and the schools’ credibility when
seeking to convince young people that “our Constitution is a living
168
reality, not parchment preserved under glass.”
In its most recent student speech ruling, Morse v. Frederick, the
Supreme Court upheld a principal’s decision to suspend a senior who
had unfurled a 14–foot “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner as he stood
169
watching the Olympic Torch Relay go past his high school.
The
eighteen-year-old student, Joseph Frederick, had brought the banner
from home, ostensibly hoping to catch the attention of TV cameras
170
covering the Olympic event.
When Principal Deborah Morse saw
Frederick and his classmates holding the banner up across the street
from the school, she demanded that the students immediately put it
171
down.
As Morse would later explain to the student, she believed
the banner promoted drug use, an interpretation the majority of the
Court accepted as plausible despite the banner’s “cryptic”
172
phrasing.
The principal anticipated that other students, school
district personnel, parents, and members of the public would
interpret the banner as she did and see a failure to demand its
removal as a contradiction of the school’s unequivocal stand against
173
drug abuse.
Reviewing the student speech precedents, Chief Justice Roberts
stressed the “marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fraser’s]
174
speech.”
Chief Justice Roberts drew specific attention to the
observations in Justice Brennan’s Fraser concurrence that school
officials there had sought only to maintain order in a high school
166. Id. at 282.
167. Id. at 288.
168. Id. at 290 (citing Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir.
1972)).
169. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007).
170. Id. at 396–97, 401. The school’s staff and students had been given
permission to leave the school to watch as the Torch Relay passed by. The Court
accepted that students were subject to school policies addressing behavior while
on an approved social event or class trip even if, like Frederick, they were not
standing on school property and had not yet entered the school building that
day. Id. at 397, 401.
171. Id. at 398.
172. Id. at 401.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 404 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1996)).
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assembly and that there had been no indication that school officials
175
reacted to Fraser’s speech because they disagreed with his views.
Finding the analytic formula used in Fraser “unclear,” Chief Justice
Roberts extracted two key principles from that opinion: “[T]he
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
176
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”
and “the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” given
that the Fraser Court had not required a demonstration of substantial
177
disruption.
The Chief Justice then framed his consideration of whether
Frederick’s punishment could be reconciled with the First
Amendment by noting that the Court’s school search and drug
testing precedents had established that deterring student drug use
was clearly an important, and perhaps even a compelling, interest in
light of the special physical harms associated with drug abuse during
178
critical periods of child development.
In his synthesis of student
speech precedents, the Chief Justice endorsed giving school officials
some latitude to regulate or even punish student speech in the
179
absence of substantial disruption.
However, he explicitly reaffirmed Tinker’s warning that schools may not prohibit student
speech based only on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” and
underscored that Principal Morse’s reaction was not grounded in “an
180
abstract desire to avoid controversy.”
Moreover, he forcefully
rebuffed the claim that prior precedent allowed school officials to
181
restrict any student speech they deemed “plainly offensive.”

175. Id.
176. Id. at 404–05 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682).
177. Id. at 405.
178. Id. at 407. Morse specifically highlighted that Congress had, pursuant to a
federal funding condition, mandated that schools provide an anti-drug
curriculum and present “a clear and consistent message that . . . the illegal use
of drugs [is] wrong and harmful.” Id. at 408 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6)
(2000 & Supp. IV 2006)).
179. Id. at 404.
180. Id. at 408–09 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508–09 (1969)).
181. Id. at 409. The National School Boards Association had argued, “[s]ince
school officials handle day-to-day operations of their schools, and school board
members are typically members of the local community, they are best situated to
apply evolving community standards in their schools and to determine whether a
student’s speech is counter to or ‘plainly offensive’ to their educational mission.”
Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-278).
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In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito
stressed the danger ahead if there was any hint that student speech
could be suppressed based on the vague assertion that such speech
182
interfered with the school’s “educational mission.”
This kind of
justification, Justice Alito wrote, would allow public school officials to
regulate speech simply because they disagree with the viewpoint —a
183
rationale that “strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.”
To cabin Morse’s implications, Justice Alito offered this careful
description of its holding:
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (1) it
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict
speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating
illegal drug use and (2) it provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue, including speech on issues such as the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for
medicinal use.
I join the opinion of the Court on the
understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special
characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other
184
speech restrictions.

Thus, although Morse’s endorsement of a very specific form of
185
viewpoint discrimination has drawn criticism, both the opinion for
the court and the concurrence of Justices Alito and Kennedy
recognize important limitations on schools’ authority to curtail
student speech and express concern about the potential abuse of
school authority to silence student speech that is political or
controversial, telegraphing at least some hope for the protection of
186
future student dissenters.
182. Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 422.
185. See id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Morse analysis as
“invit[ing] stark viewpoint discrimination” by school officials); see also Hans Bader,
BONG HiTS 4 JESUS: The First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 142
(describing Morse as departing from understanding that “[w]hatever other limits the
Supreme Court has placed on students’ free speech rights in the past, it had never
countenanced viewpoint discrimination of student speech prior to Morse”); The
Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 300 (2007) (decrying
Morse as “overreaching and too unprincipled to allow for consistent application in
practice” and predicting it “will make it easy for other schools and other courts to
discover new subject areas in which student speech can be prohibited”).
186. See Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially
Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 484–86 (2008)
(describing amici filings of religious legal advocacy groups asserting apprehensions
about implications for student religious speech at school if the Court accepted the
argument that schools could restrict speech that officials saw as “counter to the
school’s educational mission”).
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The Tinker Court rejected the idea that student dissent was
187
incompatible with the instructional mission of the public schools,
emphasizing that “the process of education in a democracy must be
188
democratic.”
As the Court qualified its endorsement of students’
expressive liberty, authorizing limitations on student speech in Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Morse, school officials were able to seize on the often
imprecise descriptions of the scope of their authority to justify
silencing or punishing student speakers, especially those who took
issue with school policies or the conduct of teachers or
administrators. School officials, like reviewing courts, failed to
consistently resist what Jamin Raskin has aptly described as the
189
“undertow of institutional authoritarianism.”
As Justice Thomas
observed in his Morse concurrence, the Supreme Court’s
“jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools
190
except when they do not,” putting student-critics and effective
education for citizenship at risk.
III. DISSENT DEVALUED: THE VULNERABILITY OF THE STUDENT AS A
CITIZEN CRITIC
Can public school students serve as citizen-critics? As a matter of
First Amendment doctrine, should they be afforded vigilant
protection when they speak out against what they identify as official
misconduct, deficient performance of duty, obstruction of needed
change, or the unjust use of authority? This Article argues that
children can and have assumed the role of responsible citizen-critics
191
However,
in American schools as well as in other social contexts.
school officials, both teachers and administrators, often devalue or
dismiss the messages of the youngest dissenters. Even when this
mistaken reaction prompts judicial correction, the articulated
rationale for the protection of student speech frequently underplays
the value of critical student speech and rarely considers how the
187. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–11 (1969);
see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1779–80 (1987) (construing Tinker as
offering a variation on the analysis used in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972), which focused on “whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”).
188. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 159 (1969).
189. Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and Unrealized
Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1201, 1205–06 (2009).
190. Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). Unfortunately, Justice
Thomas’s preferred corrective to the vagaries of the Supreme Court’s analysis of
children’s rights under the Free Speech Clause would be to “dispense with Tinker
altogether.” Id. at 422.
191. See infra notes 200–33 and accompanying text.
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suppression of student criticism could be at odds with schools’
responsibility to inculcate the habits of citizenship. Moreover, recent
rulings on qualified immunity may have significantly diminished fear
about legal liability as a force inhibiting school officials’ tendency to
192
react repressively.
If, as Steven Shiffrin has argued, the First Amendment should be
193
understood to “reflect a commitment to promoting dissent” in order
to realize an overarching constitutionally grounded ambition to
cultivate citizens’ capacities to identify and redress injustice, such a
194
commitment would inform the nation’s educational enterprise.
However, as Shiffrin has lamented, such an ethos is often not only
195
absent from American classrooms but actively discouraged there.
As will be documented in this section, today’s student critic should
expect hostility from school personnel and inconsistent protection
from federal courts.
A. The Persistent Presence of the Child’s Dissenting Voice
American children have occupied an important place in both the
rhetoric and reality of our constitutional culture. The special power
of a child’s voice in presenting an indictment of unjust authority
reverberates across centuries of American political dissent, emanating
from our founding generation. The rhetoric of the Revolutionary
Era repeatedly portrayed the American colonist as “the rightfully
196
rebellious child of autocratic parents.”
Thomas Paine, in
particular, favored the use of images of suffering children to
“summon both the feeling of a situation demanding immediate
response and the confidence that present inequities and difficulties
will be overcome” as the empowered colonial child rises up heroically

192. See infra notes 364–81 and accompanying text.
193. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 24, at 91.
194. Id. at 112.
195. See id. at 113 (noting how elements of public school curricula such as daily
ritual recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and content of social studies texts
powerfully reinforce models of citizenship rooted in conformity and submission to
governmental authority); see also Brent T. White, Ritual, Emotion, and Political Belief:
The Search for the Constitutional Limit to Patriotic Education in Public Schools, 43 GA. L.
REV. 447, 449, 453–54 (2009) (arguing that the primary ambition and predominant
effect of patriotic education curriculum, including daily pledge recitation, is the
creation of emotional attachment to the nation in a manner that suppresses critical
appraisal of government).
196. GILLIAN BROWN, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: THE LOCKEAN LEGACY IN
EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE 16 (2001) (connecting the recurrent use of images of
aggrieved children to the installation of citizen consent at the center of American
constitutional vision).
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197

against its cruel and imperial parent. In the nineteenth century as
the country grappled with the coming of the Civil War, Walt
Whitman would continue to use depictions of a child as a persuasive
vehicle in political and social debate, evoking the child as “bearer of
authenticity and ‘true consciousness’” to reflect back the problematic
nature of the society that would shape and potentially deform the
198
developing child.
Children, like other dissenters, have raised their voices to express
“the fears, hopes, and aspirations of the less powerful to those in
199
200
power.”
Child workers advanced the struggle for labor rights.
Small girls faced down police and stood their ground as they went on
201
Messenger boys
strike for fair wages at box and match factories.
protested against excessive work schedules, pay delays, and worker
202
fines. Young girls from New York City’s garment factories marched
for safer working conditions and an end to exploitation, and
newsboys staged strikes when paper owners tried to price them out of
203
their jobs and replace them with scab sellers.
As active participants in the civil rights protests of the 1950s and
1960s, black children and youth met shocking official brutality with
courage and dignity, inspiring black and white Americans to press
204
forward for the enactment of civil rights statutes.
Before Rosa
197. See id. at 100–06 (analyzing Paine’s use of images of a wronged but ultimately
triumphant child to project the image of colonists’ course from “subjection to selfgovernment”).
198. CAROLINE F. LEVANDER, CRADLE OF LIBERTY: RACE, THE CHILD, AND NATIONAL
BELONGING FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO W.E.B. DU BOIS 9–12 (2006).
199. SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, supra note 26, at 96.
200. Caroline G. Trinkley, Child Labor in America: An Historical Analysis, 13 IN PUB.
INTEREST 59, 84 (1993).
201. Id. at 84–86.
202. Id. at 87.
203. Id. at 86, 89; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence:
Children as Heroes in the Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1569, 1571–72 (citing
the history of children’s role in labor protests as chronicled in SUSAN CAMPBELL
BARTOLETTI, KIDS ON STRIKE! 8–12, 27 (1999)).
204. See CYNTHIA LEVINSON, WE’VE GOT A JOB: THE 1963 BIRMINGHAM CHILDREN’S
MARCH (2012) (presenting interviews with children, some as young as nine, who were
willing to risk arrest by joining thousands of other students in civil rights protest
marches in May 1963). See generally ELIZABETH PARTRIDGE, MARCHING FOR FREEDOM:
WALK TOGETHER, CHILDREN, AND DON’T YOU GROW WEARY (2009) (recounting
experiences of elementary and high school students participating in the 1965
Alabama marches for voting rights); Sam Dillon, Wisdom of Leaders and Guidance for
Graduates, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at A22 (presenting an excerpt from an address
by University of Maryland, Baltimore County President Freeman Hrabowski III in
which he describes the lesson to be drawn from his decision, at age thirteen, to face
arrest and jail for joining the 1963 Birmingham civil rights demonstrations: “Even
children can think critically and make decisions that can affect their lives”). For a
comprehensive examination of the rhetorical framing of the crusade for racial
equality as a fight for black children’s futures and the special role of youth in the
black freedom struggle from 1940s through the 1960s, see REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF
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Parks, fifteen-year-old Claudette Colvin resisted segregation on
205
Colvin refused a bus driver’s
Montgomery, Alabama city buses.
demand to give up her seat to a white woman when all the seats in
206
the white section were filled and was arrested.
In April, 1951,
Barbara Johns, a high school junior from Prince Edward County,
Virginia set in motion the events that would culminate in the
207
Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.
Outraged by the stark inequality in conditions in local black and
white schools, Johns led her fellow students in a walkout from R.R.
208
Moton High School and then wrote to NAACP lawyers, urging them
209
to represent local families in a suit challenging school segregation.
Children were also at the forefront of the campaign to vindicate
the freedom of conscience in American classrooms, securing the end
210
of compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
and of
211
The Supreme
mandatory Bible reading and daily prayer rituals.
Court’s docket has consistently included claims pressed by children,
often effectively, against school practices that threaten students’ First
212
and Fourth Amendment rights.
WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY (2009); see also DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN (1998), which
recounts the role black children and youth played in sit-ins, protest marches, and
civil disobedience actions across the South during the civil rights era.
205. See generally PHILLIP M. HOOSE, CLAUDETTE COLVIN: TWICE TOWARD JUSTICE
27–35 (2009) (recounting Claudette’s story of her encounter with the police on the
bus).
206. Id. at 29–35. Colvin’s boldness spurred the city’s black leaders, including
newly arrived pastor Martin Luther King, Jr., to resolve to confront the daily
indignities blacks faced on the city bus system. Id. at 38–41. Colvin went on to
become a plaintiff in the successful constitutional challenge to the Alabama statute
and Montgomery city ordinance mandating bus segregation. Browder v. Gayle, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.).
207. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 469–70 (1975).
208. Id.; see also BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY,
VIRGINIA, 1951–1964, at 38–39 (1965) (describing the nature of the disparity in
school conditions and Barbara Johns’ rallying of her fellow students).
209. KLUGER, supra note 207, at 471; see Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and
Reparations: Systemic Reform of Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 419, 420–21 & n.6 (2006) (quoting a portion of the letter written to NAACP in
which Johns and Carrie Stokes begged for immediate legal assistance so students
could graduate on time). The lawsuit, Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952), became one of the four cases resolved in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
210. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
211. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a detailed narrative of Ellery Schempp’s decision
to challenge his Pennsylvania school district, see generally STEPHEN D. SOLOMON,
ELLERY’S PROTEST: HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION AND SPARKED THE BATTLE
OVER SCHOOL PRAYER (2007).
212. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009)
(holding school officials’ search of teenage student’s bra and underwear
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Student dissent also illuminated the difficulties that arose as school
systems implemented desegregation orders, revealing vestiges of the
discredited old order and the realities of lingering resistance to
213
needed change.
Such protests did not always find a receptive
214
judicial audience even in the immediate wake of Tinker.
Students have continued to use a variety of vehicles to deliver what
are, in effect, petitions for redress of grievances. Such vehicles
215
216
include editorials in school papers, underground publications,
217
and artistic performances. Students have expressed their concerns
218
219
about school labor practices and the treatment of faculty, and
students continue to object to over-reaching policies regarding the

unconstitutional); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
(invalidating policy allowing students to deliver opening prayers at high school
football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating practice of
inviting clergy to deliver opening and closing messages at public school graduation
ceremonies); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231 (1990) (rejecting school’s
assertion that complying with Equal Access Act by giving student religious club access
to school facilities would violate Establishment Clause).
213. See Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 176–77, 183 (D. Mass.
1976) (noting the history of black student boycotts and white parent and student
protests as the school district grappled with implementation of busing plan), aff’d,
565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 414 F.
Supp. 1336, 1339 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (characterizing the presence or absence of
student protest against white administrators as an indicator of how successfully a
school district was desegregating).
214. See, e.g., Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 975, 976 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding
the suspension of twenty-nine black students who exited a school pep rally in “quiet
procession” to protest playing of “Dixie”); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213, 215,
217 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding the suspension of a black student from the band
when he declined to play “Dixie” during a pep rally).
215. See, e.g., Sommer Ingram, Newspapers Containing Editorial Critical of School’s PE Program
Confiscated, SPLC (June 18, 2010), http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2108
(criticizing school principal for destroying student newspapers because of editorial
proposing ways to reduce PE costs). For an examination of how to protect students
speaking out on controversial issues in their school newspapers, see Tyler J. Buller,
The State Response to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished article),
available at http://works.bepress.com/tyler_buller/2/.
216. See, e.g., Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 11, 14–15 (7th Cir. 1970)
(finding that the complaint challenging the expulsion of students for the on-campus
distribution of an underground newspaper containing criticism of school policies
and officials demonstrated an unjustified invasion of First Amendment rights).
217. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, A Student Play Blasting N.Y. School Reform is Banned,
WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/answersheet/school-turnaroundsreform/a-student-play-criticizing-sch.html.
218. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting school’s claim that students’ wearing of “scab” buttons to express
opposition to use of replacement teachers during teachers’ strike would be
“inherently disruptive”).
219. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1973) (concluding that
students could not be disciplined for bringing signs to school to protest school’s
refusal to renew English teacher’s contract but that the school could take away the
signs based on forecast of disruption).
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220

recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. They have protested against
221
school uniform policies, staged write-in campaigns in opposition to
222
limits on who is eligible to be a student government officer,
objected to perceived irregularities in ballot counting in a vote on a
223
224
class t-shirt design, urged a boycott of a school fund-raising drive,
225
School
and registered their opposition to school budget cuts.
discipline policies and their allegedly inequitable or unreasonable
226
application have repeatedly drawn student ire,
and students
continue to rally on behalf of minority constituencies victimized by
227
administrator prejudice.
220. See Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1285–86 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (rejecting high school junior’s First Amendment challenge to
Florida statute requiring students to obtain parental permission in order to be
excused from reciting Pledge); cf. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d
1252 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether paddling of student who silently raised his fist during daily flag salute was
motivated by desire to suppress what the teacher and principal viewed as student’s
supposedly unpatriotic viewpoint).
221. See DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 636 (D.N.J. 2007)
(enjoining the threatened suspension of fifth graders for wearing buttons with words
“No School Uniforms” and red slashed circle printed over a photograph of
uniformed Hitler Youth).
222. See, e.g., Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1457–61
(E.D. Ark. 1990) (rejecting a student’s claim that the rule requiring students seeking
office to obtain approval from two-thirds of student’s current teachers had been
applied to retaliate against “outspokenness” but noting that the school had decided
to amend policy after filing of suit to specify the criteria teachers should use in
evaluating students and allowing appeals procedures for students denied requisite
teacher approval).
223. See Brandt v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.3d 460, 462–63, 467 (7th Cir. 2007)
(rejecting eighth graders’ First Amendment challenge to rule banning clothing with
“inappropriate word[s] or slogans” as applied to shirts worn to protest perceived
irregularities in voting to select school t-shirt design).
224. See Hatter v. L.A. City High Sch. Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1971)
(reversing the district court’s finding that students suspended for distributing
“Boycott Chocolates” flyers did not address issue of “sufficient social importance” to
merit First Amendment protection).
225. See Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying
plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in light of the district’s voluntary reduction of
suspension term).
226. See, e.g., Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 161–63 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the
punishment of a student who participated in sit-in to protest the suspension of three
classmates); Acevedo v. Sklarz, 553 F. Supp. 2d 164, 167–70 (D. Conn. 2008)
(rejecting the claim that a student’s suspension and arrest for refusing the principal’s
demand that he stop filming police officer’s alleged use of excessive force on
another student in school hallway violated his clearly established First Amendment
right); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 30–31 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (upholding a high
school’s expulsion of students for distributing leaflets urging classmates to stage a
walk-out to protest discipline policies in light of the disruption caused by a related
walk-out).
227. See Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. Sch. Bd., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1361, 1379 (N.D.
Fla. 2008) (invalidating the suspension of a student for violating rule that prohibited
wearing or displaying symbols or messages urging fair treatment and acceptance of
persons who are gay; the ban was imposed after the student began to organize a
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Some student dissenters whose efforts were rebuffed by school
authorities may have been ahead of their time, urging, for example,
reluctant school authorities to confront how emerging conceptions of
228
gender equality and identity should alter outdated dress code rules.
Other student voices have pressed claims exposing resistance to and
anxiety about societal transitions reflecting an evolving
understanding of how our constitutional commitment to equal
229
protection defines schools’ corresponding legal duties.

campaign to protest an administrator’s flagrant hostility to gay student and inaction
against anti-gay bullying).
228. See, e.g., Press v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 552, 559 (S.D.
Tex. 1971) (upholding the suspension of an eighth-grade girl who organized a
march at school protesting rule barring girls from wearing “any type of trouser
garment”). Some of the protesting students had worn pantsuits to school. Id. at 560.
Plaintiff Sabrina Press marched wearing a maxi dress over a pantsuit, later lending
the dress to another girl who faced suspension if she did not change out of her
pantsuit. Ms. Press initiated the march after collecting a thousand signatures on a
petition calling for an end to the no-trousers-for-girls rule and submitted the petition
to the school district, which had refused to change the rule. Id. at 558; see also
Complaint Against Rickey Clopton, Copiah County School District, and Ronald
Greer ¶ 3, Sturgis v. Copiah Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:10–CV–455–DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL
4351355 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011) (challenging the school district’s refusal to
include the plaintiff’s senior portrait in her high school yearbook because she had
chosen to wear a tuxedo rather than the drape customarily worn by female students).
Ceara Sturgis and the school reached a settlement, and the suit was dismissed with
prejudice on May 1, 2012. Order Dismissing Case, Sturgis v. Copiah Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
No. 3:10–CV–455–DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL 4351355 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011).
229. See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Ind. Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668
(7th Cir. 2008) (finding likelihood of success in a student’s claim that the school
could not prevent him from wearing “Be Happy, Not Gay” t-shirt to express
opposition to “Day of Silence” observance in which students and school officials took
forms of symbolic action to draw attention to harassment and stigmatization of gay
students); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding
no First Amendment violation in the suspension of a student who wore a t-shirt that
said “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS
CONDEMNED” on the front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans
1:27’” on the back; the student asserted that he wore the shirt to express his religious
belief and to convey opposition to the school’s observance of “Day of Silence”),
vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007); Crosby ex. rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802
(4th Cir. 1988) (upholding a Virginia high school principal’s decision to end the use
of “Johnny Reb” mascot despite objections voiced by some students through a
petition drive, ribbon-wearing campaign, and statements at school board meetings.
Principal had taken no disciplinary action against students opposing mascot
change and had not restricted their expressive activities); Melton v. Young, 465
F.2d 1332, 1333 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding the suspension of a student who wore
Confederate flag emblem on his jacket after the school district, facing ongoing
racial tension and confrontations between students three years after desegregating,
discontinued the use of “Dixie” as the school’s pep song and the Confederate flag
as the school symbol).
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B. Dismissing the Student Critic: Errors and Alternatives
230

The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lowery v. Euverard and the Third
231
Circuit’s decision in Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard offer a
useful starting place for an examination of the appropriate
constitutional protection owed student petition and protest activities
in school. In both cases, school officials punished or curtailed
student petition efforts, and reviewing courts upheld the officials’
232
By identifying the deficiencies in these opinions and
actions.
noting that alternative analytical approaches have protected student
speech in similar circumstances, this Section invites consideration of
how both schools and courts should translate what the Constitution
demands in such situations.
Demanding unquestioning obedience: Lowery v. Euverard
In Lowery v. Euverard, four members of a varsity football team
drafted and circulated a short, unsophisticated petition that they
233
planned to present to the principal as the 2005 season ended. The
petition was not eloquently phrased, stating simply “I hate Coach
234
Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him.”
The boys acted in
response to what they saw as the head football coach’s abusive, unfair,
235
The drafters and signers,
and unproductive treatment of players.
eighteen of the team’s thirty-seven players, hoped that the head
coach would be removed by the school district at the end of the
236
season.
However, when Euverard learned about the petition in
early October, each player who had signed the petition was led by an

1.

230. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
231. 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003).
232. For further discussion of Lowery and Walker-Serrano, see infra Part III.B.1.
233. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585.
234. Id. The brief for Euverard and the other members of the coaching staff
asserted that, because no specific remedy was sought in the text of the circulated
document, it should not be treated as a petition. Final Brief of Defendants
Appellants Marty Euverard et al. at 9, Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
2007) (No. 06-6172).
235. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585. Coach Euverard’s three year record at Jefferson
County High was 6-13. Jeff Lockridge, BGA Gains from Euverard Return, TENNESSEAN,
Mar. 20, 2007, at C.2. The alleged misconduct included punching players in the
head, failing to stop other members of the coaching staff from using unnecessary
force with players, repeatedly humiliating and cursing at the team, tearing up the
college recruiting letters of players with whom Euverard was displeased, and
imposing a year-round conditioning program in violation of applicable league rules.
Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, at 9–10.
236. Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, at
10–14 (noting that a number of players who objected to Euverard’s conduct had
already quit the team before the petition was circulated and that three prominent
players, including the starting quarterback, had joined the petition effort). There
were no allegations that anyone had been harassed or pressured to sign the petition.
Id. at 12.
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assistant coach into an office where, apart from any other students,
237
If the player refused to apologize
he faced the irate head coach.
and say that he wanted to play for Euverard, the player was dismissed
238
from the squad. This action threatened to end the students’ high
school football careers, foreclosing a route from the rural Tennessee
239
community to college via an athletic scholarship.
The school’s principal and district officials sided with the coach
and would not reverse the decision to kick Derrick Lowery, Randy
Giles, Joseph Dooley, and Dillon Spurlock off the squad
240
permanently.
No investigation of Euverard’s behavior appears to
241
Instead, the principal
have been undertaken by the district.
reportedly told plaintiff Spurlock that he had been “stupid” to sign
242
the petition, saying it was “the wrong way” to address the situation.
The players initiating the petition in Lowery had identified
potentially serious misconduct, worthy of investigation by their school
system. Recent headlines raise the specter of coaches engaging in
sexual or physical abuse of young athletes, conduct that exacts an
enormous human toll and creates serious legal consequences for the
243
schools involved. Coaches’ disregard of players’ health by pushing
practices beyond recommended limits has also prompted public
244
Thus, it is not hard to envision
concern and legal action.
237. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586. The boys who had circulated the petition appeared
fearful that the encounter with the coaching staff could be physically threatening
based on the coaches’ prior behavior. See Final Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees, supra
note 234, at 22–23 (recounting incident in which a student was grabbed by the
throat by an assistant coach, prompting the student to quit the team).
238. See Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234,
at 28 (explaining that Euverard “forgave” any players who admitted signing the
petition and apologized for doing so).
239. Jefferson County High was the only public high school serving in the county
and offered the only high school football program (public or private) in the county.
Id. at 7. Two of the four plaintiffs, unable to move or to afford private school, could
not play again. Id. at 52.
240. Id. at 26–27.
241. Id. at 26.
242. Id. at 25–26. Speaking with a player’s mother shortly after the players were
dismissed, the district’s Director of Schools made the following remark: “You
probably don’t want to know my ideas on student petitions, do you?” Id. at 26–27.
243. See Jesse McKinley, After Penn State Case, Coaches Face New Scrutiny, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 15, 2012, at A18 (noting that in the wake of child sexual abuse allegations
against a former member of Penn State coaching staff, there was a surge of state
legislative initiatives subjecting youth sports coaches to additional scrutiny before
hiring, such as criminal background checks, and including coaches among
mandated reporters of suspected child physical or sexual abuse).
244. Football coaches have faced civil and criminal liability when student athletes
died during summer practices in intense heat. See, e.g., Kentucky High School Football
Coach Charged with Reckless Homicide in Player’s Death, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,481645,00.html. A jury acquitted the coach
of both reckless homicide and wanton endangerment charges, but the deceased
player’s family asserted that the charges had brought about needed changes in
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circumstances in which student athletes justifiably petition for the
correction of administrators’ lax oversight of athletic staff.
Testifying at trial, the students who signed the petition emphasized
that they wanted to play football for their school; they simply did not
want to be subjected to the humiliation and abuse Coach Euverard
245
Coach
had used, very unsuccessfully, to motivate the players.
Euverard claimed at trial that he had not dismissed the players
because of the petition but because of their insubordinate refusal to
246
do what he demanded in the confrontation about the petition.
Trial testimony from Euverard and other members of the coaching
staff confirmed that the students had not refused to follow directions
during practices or spoken disrespectfully to any member of the
247
coaching staff prior to the discovery of the petition.
The school
defendants contended that Coach Euverard’s behavior could not be
questioned without undermining the ability of the football program
to advance its goal of “the overall development of the student athlete,
248
teaching leadership, responsibility and life skills.”
Dismissively
characterizing the extension of constitutional protection to the
students’ petition as what would, in effect, be a “license to be
249
insubordinate and discourteous” to school personnel,
the
defendant coaches went on to argue, without any apparent sense of
irony, that protecting the students’ speech and invalidating their
removal from the team would undermine the school’s recognized

schools’ practice policies. Jason Riley, Stinson Found Not Guilty in PRP Player’s Death,
COURIER-J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 11:32 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20090917
/SPORTS05/909170320/Stinson-found-not-guilty-PRP-player-s-death; see also School
District Reaches Agreement in High School Player’s Death, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2009, 2:49
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/preps/football/2009-09-09-montana-deathsettlement_N.htm (reporting that a school district agreed to settle with the parents
of a seventeen-year-old football player who collapsed and died after practicing during
intense heat and smoky conditions). Practicing under such weather conditions
contradicts the recommendations of the National Athletics Trainers Association. Paul
J. Weber, Despite Deaths, Schools Resist Changing Heat Plans, FOX NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2009Sep14/0,4675,FBHHeatGuideli
nes,00.html; see also Anahad O’Connor, Trying to Reduce Head Injuries, Youth Football
Limits Practices, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1 (describing how youth football
programs are modifying training in response to evidence of special danger that
concussions pose for younger players).
245. See Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234,
at 16 (noting that team record had been 2–4 before petition had been drafted).
246. Id. at 22.
247. See Final Reply Brief of Appellants Marty Euverard et al. at 8, Lowery v.
Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-6172) (citing the trial testimony of
plaintiff Dillon Spurlock that he loved football and wanted to play for Jefferson
County but did not want to play for Euverard because he had no respect for him).
248. Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234,
at 41–42.
249. Id. at 42.
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authority to “teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
250
order.”
The Sixth Circuit panel opinion proceeded from the premise that
students’ speech rights would necessarily be constrained because
“[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order,
251
teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”
The court
stressed the following:
Public schools are necessarily not run as a democracy. Schools
exist to provide a forum whereby those with wisdom and
experience (the teachers) impart knowledge to those who lack
wisdom and experience (the students). Unlike our system of
government, the authority structure is not bottom-up, but topdown. The authority of school officials does not depend upon the
consent of the students. To threaten this structure is to threaten
252
the mission of the public school system.

Tinker’s disruption standard had to be adapted to the special
demands of a high school football program, an environment where
“execution of the coach’s will is paramount” because the coach
determines how best to achieve the team’s principal goal of winning
253
athletic competitions.
The petitioning players effectively sought a
“right to belong to the Jefferson County football team on their own
254
terms” and sought to establish a “right to unilaterally undertake a
referendum on the coach’s authority.” The players, the majority
reasoned, wanted “a bottom-up authority structure for high school
athletics,” but “[a] high school athletic team could not function
smoothly with an authority structure based on the will of the
255
players.”
Concluding the school officials could have anticipated
that a “material and substantial” disruption would result from the
petition, the majority held that the school could, under Tinker,
256
remove the players based solely on their circulation of the petition.
The majority brushed aside the students’ argument that school
officials had failed to offer specific evidence of actual or foreseeable
disruption, reasoning that concepts like team morale and unity are
250. Id. at 43 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
251. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 589 (quoting Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
254. Id. at 589.
255. See id. at 591. The majority contrasted the events at issue in Lowery with
circumstances in which student athletes’ communication of grievances could be
protected, such as when a coach had “put his authority into play.” Id. (citing Pinard
v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006)). For further discussion of
Pinard, see Part III.B.2.
256. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591–92.
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not quantifiable, despite their important impact on a team.
Returning to the opinion’s central theme and with no apparent
unease about defending Coach Euverard’s claimed entitlement to the
students’ unquestioning obedience, the court elaborated:
The success of an athletic team in large part depends on its coach.
The coach determines the strategies and plays, and “sets the tone”
for the team. The coach, particularly at the high school level, is
also responsible for providing “an educational environment
conducive to learning team unity and sportsmanship and free from
disruptions and distractions that could hurt or stray the
cohesiveness of the team.” . . . The ability of the coach to lead is
inextricably linked to his ability to maintain order and discipline.
Thus, attacking the authority of the coach necessarily undermines
his ability to lead the team . . . . Plaintiffs’ circulation of a petition
stating “I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for
him” was a direct challenge to Euverard’s authority, and
undermined his ability to lead the team. It could have no other
258
effect.

To bolster its conclusion that Tinker offered no protection for the
players’ petition, the majority drew parallels between school officials’
concerns and those of a public employer facing a disgruntled
259
employee. Comparing the athletes’ claims to those of government
workers and drawing on the principles laid out in the thencontrolling Supreme Court public employee speech precedents,
260
261
Pickering v. Board of Education and Connick v. Myers, the majority
262
found a further flaw in the students’ claim. Their speech failed to
263
address what the court would classify as a matter of public concern.
Despite the underlying accusations of bullying and misuse of power
levied by the players against Euverard, their petition did not
264
represent a “whistleblower situation.”
Concurring in the result on the ground that school officials could
properly claim qualified immunity due to the lack of clearly
257. Id. at 593.
258. Id. at 594. The court then speculated that the petitioning players might try to
increase the likelihood that the school district would fire Euverard by playing poorly,
producing losses for their team and sowing divisions among players as losses
mounted. Id. at 594–95.
259. Id. at 597. The Lowery majority, however, saw the speech of student athletes
as less likely to be protected than that of public employees given the closely
supervised, highly regulated status of high school team members and the voluntary
character of sports participation. Id. at 600.
260. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
261. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
262. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597–99.
263. Id. at 598 n.5.
264. Id. at 600.
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established law addressing similar facts, Judge Gilman sharply
criticized the majority’s treatment of the students’ First Amendment
265
To Judge Gilman, school officials had not, as Tinker
claims.
required, shown a reasonable basis for anticipating substantial
266
disruption of or material interference with school activities.
In
addition, he objected vigorously to “grafting” a public concern
requirement onto the Tinker formula, potentially narrowing the
267
protection afforded student speech.
Probing for retaliatory motive: Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J
Cataloguing the majority opinion’s deficiencies in Lowery, Judge
Gilman called attention to the fact that the court had declined to
follow the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive analysis of very similar claims in
268
In Pinard, members of an
Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J.
Oregon high school varsity basketball team faced abusive treatment
269
While berating the students for poor play, the
from their coach.
coach had presented this choice: They could either quit the team or
270
ask for his resignation and he would go. The team co-captains then
called a meeting at which all players attending, with the exception of
the coach’s son, decided to draft a petition seeking the coach’s
271
resignation. The boys delivered the petition to the coach the next
day at school, and he immediately brought it to the school principal
272
and the district superintendent.
The principal advised the coach
not to resign at that time, and the superintendent proposed meeting
with the players to get more information about the situation. Saying
2.

265. Id. at 601, 606 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment).
266. Id. at 601.
267. Id.
268. 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006).
269. The players alleged that the coach, Jeff Baughman, subjected them to
physical intimidation, slapping and hitting them, as well as tirades laced with
profanity and demeaning taunts. Id. at 760.
270. Id. at 760 n.6.
271. Id. at 760. The petition read as follows:
As of February 12, 2001, the Clatskanie Tigers Boys Varsity Basketball
Team would like to formally request the immediate resignation of Coach
Jeff Baughman. As a team we no longer feel comfortable playing for him
as a coach. He has made derogative [sic] remarks, made players
uncomfortable playing for him, and is not leading the team in the right
direction. We feel that as a team and as individuals we would be better off
if we were to finish the season with a replacement coach. We, the
undersign [sic], believe this is in the best interest of the team, school,
town, and for the players and fans. We would appreciate the full
cooperation of all the parties involved.
Id. at 760–61. Under their signatures the players typed the following: “[W]e will not
be approached individually on this. This was a team decision and we will be
addressed as a team.” Id. at 761.
272. Id.
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he felt “upset and hurt” by the petition, the coach asked for and
273
received permission to take the rest of the day off.
After leaving the school the coach called another member of the
coaching staff, telling him that he “wanted to know who his backstabbers were” and that he planned “to corner the little sons-of274
bitches and not give them an out.”
The coach reported that the
principal had responded to the petition by offering two options: He
could resign or he could “tell the players to either get on the bus and
play or if they chose not to board the bus to turn in their
275
uniforms.”
The coach claimed that the principal and school
athletic director urged him to pursue the second option.
The principal met with the players, who stated that they would not
276
want to continue to play if the coach remained in charge.
The
principal advised the team members that an investigation would have
to be conducted before the coach could be removed. The players
were told they could either take part in a mediation to be conducted
by the principal and athletic director and play for the school that
night or, if they declined to enter mediation, forfeit the privilege of
277
playing in the game. The players did not remember being told that
they would be suspended from the team if they refused to play that
278
night, and the principal could not recall giving such a warning.
The students were not told that the coach had informed the principal
he did not want to coach the game and that a replacement coach had
279
been enlisted.
Believing that Jeff Baughman, the coach, would be
280
at the game, the petitioning players decided not to participate.
With junior varsity players as replacements, the team suffered a 50
point loss. The signers later testified that they would have played had
281
they known Baughman would not be there.
Meeting the next day with the signers’ parents, the principal
informed them that their sons were permanently suspended from the
282
team for not attending the game.
After appealing the sanction to
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 762 & n.8.
279. Id. at 762.
280. Id. One signer, a team co-captain whose father was the school’s assistant
athletic director, decided to participate in the game.
281. Id.
282. Id. The school’s Code of Conduct and Appearance for Athletes stated that
athletes “will travel to and from contests with coach and team” unless specifically
given permission not to do so and authorized that “an athlete may be disciplined for
conduct termed detrimental to the team and/or school.” Id. at 762 n.11. The
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the school board, which upheld the principal’s decision, the students
filed suit in federal district court asserting that they had been
283
punished for exercising their First Amendment rights. The district
court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that the players’ petition was not constitutionally protected
because it did not address a matter of public concern and instead
resembled the unprotected private grievance of an employee, lacking
284
any “political dimension.”
Offering an alternative ground for the
summary judgment grant, the district court reasoned that the
students’ speech had “substantially and materially interfered with a
school activity” and could therefore be punished even if it would
285
otherwise be considered protected speech.
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that the
players’ petition and the complaints they presented about the coach
286
in their meeting with school administrators were “pure speech.”
Relying on Tinker, the panel reasoned that the players could only be
punished if the officials could cite facts forming a reasonable basis for
forecasting that the petition would cause “substantial disruption of or
287
material interference with school activities.” The panel emphasized
that Tinker supplied the relevant framework for analyzing student
speech that is not school-sponsored and that is not lewd, vulgar,
288
obscene, or plainly offensive.
The panel further emphasized that,
unlike public employee speech precedents, Tinker did not require
students to address a matter of public concern to merit First
289
Amendment protection.
Having shown no reasonable basis for
projecting that the students’ presentation of the petition and their
meeting with the principal and school athletic director would cause
disruption or harm others in the school, school officials could not
290
punish the petitioning students.
Although acknowledging that
students’ refusal to play in the evening game might be considered
school district later cited the Code as the basis for the players’ suspension, but the
principal, who had made the suspension decision, admitted he was not familiar with
its provisions. Id. at 762.
283. Id. at 763.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 764.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 765.
289. Id. The court did note, however, that because the players complained about
“the school’s performance of its duties to supervise its teachers, monitor
extracurricular activities and provide a safe and appropriate learning environment
for its students,” they did address “matters of public concern,” had that been the
relevant standard. Id. at 767 n.18.
290. Id. at 768.
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expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the refusal or “boycott” did materially
interfere with the school’s athletic program and could justify the
291
students’ suspension under Tinker. Nonetheless, the panel saw the
factual record as “not sufficiently clear” as to whether the students’
292
The
refusal to play was in fact what prompted their suspension.
school officials had failed to tell the players that the coach would not
be at the game even though the officials could anticipate the coach’s
293
absence might alter the players’ decision to sit out the game. That
omission suggested that the officials might be using the players’
refusal to play as a pretext, attempting to conceal that the boys were
294
suspended in retaliation against their protected petitioning activity.
The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case for the district court
295
to examine the retaliatory motive question.
The students prevailed on remand, defeating the school district’s
296
motion for summary judgment.
Examining only the question of
whether school officials had demonstrated that the suspensions
would have been imposed even if the students had not complained
about the coach in their petition, the district court found that the
297
evidence did not support the district.
The court looked at the
timing of the suspension, school officials’ expressed opposition to the
students’ speech, and other evidence that the claimed disruption of
the game was used as a pretext to conceal a retaliatory response to
298
the students’ complaints.
The proximity in time between the
presentation of the petition and the suspension supported the
inference that the players were suspended, at least in part, for their
299
speech. Because the principal had told the petitioning players that
he supported the coach, his offer to serve as a mediator of the
dispute presented the boys with a “Hobson’s choice,” precipitating
their boycott of the game and making the petition activity and the
boycott an undivided continuum of events rather than separable
300
incidents. The choice presented to the players appeared designed
to “goad or trick [them] into sanctionable behavior” that they might
291. Id. at 769.
292. Id. at 770.
293. Id. at 768.
294. Id. at 770.
295. Id.
296. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, No. 03-172-HA, 2008 WL 410097, at *6
(D. Or. Feb. 12, 2008).
297. Id. at *5.
298. Id. at *3–4.
299. Id. at *3.
300. Id.
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not have undertaken had they been properly informed.
Perhaps
most significantly, the court found that the coach, whose conduct was
the focus of the students’ complaints, appeared to have had the
ability to influence, perhaps even determine, the principal’s response
to the students’ complaints. When the petition was presented, the
principal had been a candidate for district superintendent, and the
coach was one of three members of an applicant screening
302
committee.
The principal’s eagerness to acquire or maintain the
coach’s support for his candidacy could foreseeably have altered his
response to the students’ grievances, making a retaliatory reaction
more plausible.
3. Underestimating the young critic: Walker-Serrano ex rel.
Walker v. Leonard
In early February 1999, third grader Amanda Walker-Serrano tried
to gather signatures from her classmates on a handwritten petition
rd
that presented this appeal: “We 3 grade kids don’t want to go to the
303
circus because they hurt animals. We want a better feild [sic] trip.”
Looking to inform other students at Lackawanna Trail Elementary
about how circuses mistreat performing animals and to persuade
them to join her in asking school officials to change the planned
April trip to the Shriners Circus, Amanda had taken her petition onto
the playground at recess, garnering thirty signatures the first day she
304
brought it outside. The next day, according to the school district’s
account, a teacher saw a group of children gathered around Amanda.
The group was near a patch of ice, and, as the teacher approached to
investigate what they were doing, she encountered a crying child who
305
had slipped on the ice. Although the child’s fall may have had no
connection to Amanda’s activities, the teacher admonished Amanda,
306
saying, “you can’t have that here.”
The school district contended
that this remark was an expression of concern that the writing
implements used to sign the petition could lead to injuries on the
307
slippery playground.
A teacher also reported observing children
coming to Amanda’s desk to talk to her during daily quiet reading
time, and, seeing the petition on Amanda’s desk, had concluded that
301. Id. at *6.
302. Id. at *4.
303. Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard (Walker-Serrano II), 325 F.3d 412, 414
(3d Cir. 2003).
304. Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard (Walker-Serrano I), 168 F. Supp. 2d
332, 335 (M.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d, 325 F.3d 412.
305. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414.
306. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
307. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414 n.1.
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the children were speaking to Amanda about it rather than doing
308
According to the school district, after the
their schoolwork.
principal learned about the petition, she told teachers they should
advise Amanda that she was prohibited from circulating the petition
309
on school grounds.
When Amanda’s parents’ contacted the school board president to
complain about the principal and teacher stopping her from
circulating the petition, the school district’s counsel sent them a
letter which revealed that the district saw petitioning as an unsuitable
activity for elementary school children: “Elementary schools are not
generally the environment for petition circulation, particularly where
parents are totally unaware of such activities. It is incumbent upon
school authorities, particularly in an elementary school setting, to
preserve an appropriate environment focused on the institution’s
310
instructional objectives.”
Amanda’s parents would later point out
that a social studies textbook used by her class specifically suggested
that, as a learning exercise, students could “circulate a petition on a
311
matter of community concern.”
In a second letter, the district’s lawyer seemed to offer a
different explanation of why Amanda’s signature gathering had
been shut down: her failure to submit her petition for prior
312
review by school officials.
Amanda’s parents alleged that the
prior review policy was only invoked as a post hoc justification for
stopping her petition activities and contended that the cited policy
313
had not been enforced.
308. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
309. Id.
310. Id. Educational research has, in fact, contradicted this view. See Ethel
Sadowsky, Taking Part: Democracy in the Elementary School, in PREPARING FOR
CITIZENSHIP: TEACHING YOUTH TO LIVE DEMOCRATICALLY 151, 151–64 (Ralph Mosher
et al. eds., 1994) (describing children’s effective advocacy in elementary school
community meetings); Clarissa Sawyer, Democratic Practices at the Elementary School
Level: Three Portraits, in PROMISING PRACTICES IN TEACHING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 87,
87–103 (Sheldon Berman & Phyllis LaFarge eds., 1993) (describing successful
experiments that gave students significant input into and responsibility for classroom
and school governance at the elementary and secondary level).
311. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 418.
312. The cited district policy, Policy 220, stated the following:
The Board shall require that students who wish to distribute materials
submit them for prior review. Where the reviewer cannot show within two
school days that the materials are unprotected, such materials may be
distributed . . . . The Superintendent shall develop rules and regulations
for the distribution of printed material which shall include: procedure for
the prior review of all materials to be distributed.
Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 336–37.
313. Id. at 337. The Walker-Serranos had asserted that the school had allowed a
pro-circus petition to be circulated without any prior review, but the trial court noted
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A few days before the circus trip, the school did allow Amanda to
give her classmates stickers and coloring books that criticized
314
circuses’ cruelty to performing animals. She did not go on the trip
315
and stood with her mother in protest outside the circus venue.
While standing with her mother, Amanda faced teasing from some
students from her school, including a group of boys who yelled “kill
316
the animals” and “torture the animals.”
Amanda’s experience drew local media attention. In late February,
an editorial in the Scranton Tribune offered an acerbic assessment of
the school’s reaction to the petition, writing as follows:
Here in America, the international guardian of democracy, the last
thing on earth we would want our public schools to do is
encourage children to think for themselves and embrace
democratic principles . . . . Whether circus animals are poorly
treated is a matter of intense debate around the country. One
would think that an educational institution would find a way to
examine such an issue raised by a student instead of, in effect,
317
telling her to shut up.

Reviewing courts displayed less sympathy for Amanda’s First
Amendment claims. The district court held that Amanda’s right to
circulate her petition must be clearly established to overcome the
318
school officials’ qualified immunity defense. The court noted that
it had identified no cases specifically analyzing an elementary school
student’s constitutional right to petition at school and evaluated
Amanda’s claim by consulting the broader universe of student speech
319
cases.
The district court found that the age of Amanda and her
classmates created a basis for distinguishing her case from cases
upholding the First Amendment rights of high school students to
320
distribute literature on campus. Looking at Amanda’s actions and
her principal’s and teachers’ responses, the court saw the officials as
heeding Tinker’s admonition that they “must be able to show that
that they had “presented no evidence that school officials were aware of the
existence of another petition.” Id. at 346.
314. Id. at 344.
315. Id. at 337.
316. Id. The case record does not indicate whether the boys were disciplined.
317. Lynn Manheim, Amanda Walker-Serrano, in SPEAKING OUT FOR ANIMALS: TRUE
STORIES ABOUT REAL PEOPLE WHO RESCUE ANIMALS 215, 216 (Kim W. Stallwood ed.,
2001). An editorial cartoon was also spotlighted the controversy. It depicted a little
girl holding a document labeled “First Amendment” in one hand and a paper
labeled “Circus Petition” in the other. She faced a ringmaster, wearing a jacket
saying “Lacka. Trail Elem.” and armed with a bullwhip as he wielded a chair in an
apparent effort to fend off the child. Id.
318. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
319. Id. at 342.
320. Id. at 341.
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[their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
321
In the court’s view, the officials had acted
unpopular viewpoint.”
reasonably to prevent disruption in the classroom and potential
injury on the playground, and their reactions did not reflect hostility
to her anti-animal cruelty message given that she had the opportunity
to pass out the stickers and coloring books and had not been formally
322
punished.
The opinion did not address the implications of
recognizing Amanda’s speech activities as a criticism of school
officials’ field trip choices—a characterization that could have
triggered more careful exploration of the motivation behind the
school personnel’s reaction to Amanda’s activities.
The district court did recognize, however, the right of juveniles to
323
petition the government under the First Amendment.
The court
concluded that Amanda’s right to petition had been satisfactorily
respected by allowing the child’s position to be presented to the
school board by her parents and by authorizing the distribution of
the stickers and coloring books to her classmates although the latter
324
are a non-governmental audience.
Because the court viewed the
student’s petition right as encompassed within her speech rights, her
expression could be restricted in accordance with Tinker’s anti325
disruption rationale.
Upholding the district court’s ruling, the Third Circuit panel
opinion stressed that “the First Amendment has never been
interpreted to interfere with the authority of schools to maintain an
326
environment conducive to learning.”
The panel observed that the
balance between students’ First Amendment rights and schools’ need
for order must reflect special sensitivity to the age and maturity of the
students involved, drawing on prior rulings in which the youth and
impressionability of students justified restricting speech about human
sexuality, as in Fraser, or limiting the distribution of religious
327
literature.
The panel opinion conceded that elementary students
had what were described as “qualified Tinker right[s]” but viewed
328
those rights as generally “very limited” for third graders.

321. Id. at 344 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
322. Id. at 344–46.
323. Id. at 346.
324. Id. at 347.
325. Id. at 342, 344.
326. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003).
327. Id. at 416–17.
328. Id. at 417.
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Turning to Amanda’s invocation of First Amendment protection
for the circulation of her petition, the panel confronted longstanding
precedent treating efforts to collect signatures on a petition as “the
type of interactive communication concerning political change that is
329
appropriately described as ‘core political speech.’”
The panel did
not tackle the challenge of clarifying the exact contours of
elementary students’ rights to engage in this form of political
advocacy but refused to articulate a per se rule that such political
330
advocacy would never be appropriate. Citing the fact that she was
not punished and that she was given permission to distribute anticircus stickers and coloring books, the panel saw no hostility to
Amanda’s substantive position in the school officials’ response to her
331
petition.
The panel concluded that the school’s response
represented a constitutionally acceptable effort to avoid disruptions
in the classroom and on the playground and to prevent her
332
classmates’ rights from being infringed.
In a concurring opinion that sought to express his skepticism
about Amanda’s claimed “First Amendment right to collect
signatures on a petition and thus have her fellow eight- or nine-year333
old third grade students join her protest,”
Judge Greenberg
asserted the following:
[I]t will be a rare case in which such conduct should be protected
when the signatures are sought from children as young as those
involved here, particularly in a school setting. I think that it is
unlikely that the third grade children here could have had
knowledge of how a circus treats its animals. After all, I have no
such knowledge myself. Yet Amanda induced more than 30 of
them to sign a petition that they did not want to go to the circus
because it “hurt[s] animals.” Of course, I recognize that even
adults will sign petitions without understanding the issues involved
and in doing so likely will be protected constitutionally, as will be
the persons circulating the petitions. But the status of adults differs
from that of children at school as in general public officers and
agencies have no obligation to protect adults from their own
334
conduct or the importuning by other persons.

329. Id. at 418 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988)).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 419.
332. Id. (treating the curtailment of Amanda’s petition activities as simply the
school’s effort “to regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated
in order to fulfill its custodial and pedagogical roles”).
333. Id. at 420 (Greenberg, J., concurring).
334. Id.
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Deriding the view that “it is never too early for a person to learn to
challenge authority,” Judge Greenberg connected his concerns to
Tinker’s “rights of others” reservation and expressed apprehensions
335
about an eight- or nine-year-old feeling pressured to sign a petition.
The judge also anticipated that parents might view elementary school
petitions as an incursion on their parental prerogatives, writing that
“parents do not send their children, particularly young children, to
school in order for them to be solicited to state their opinions on
336
matters of public concern or school administration.” In his view, it
is not appropriate to solicit the signatures of third grade children on
a petition asking them to state their views without the advice and
337
consent of the children’s parents.
In contrast, Judge Fullam, a district judge sitting by designation,
wrote separately to distance himself from his colleagues’ disparaging
appraisal of the capacity of Amanda and her classmates to form and
338
express a protectable perspective on the circus trip.
Rather than
questioning Amanda’s right to circulate her petition, Judge Fullam
focused only on whether, in light of a distinct likelihood of
disruption, school officials could impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on her activities, a more demanding standard
339
that he believed could still support the district court’s ruling.
The Third Circuit panel opinion in Walker-Serrano interpreted the
fact that Amanda was not punished for her petitioning as effectively
negating any inference that school officials had any improper,
340
censorial motive. School officials did, however, block her efforts to
speak to her classmates about the petition in order to seek their
signatures, thereby frustrating her classroom First Amendment
341
experiment.
Under these circumstances, the absence of
punishment mitigates but does not eliminate the First Amendment
injury. Amanda’s expressive objectives included communicating her
own views about circuses’ mistreatment of animals, seeking to
persuade her classmates to share her position, and joining with
likeminded classmates to ask that school officials offer a field trip that
335. Id. at 421.
336. Id. at 420.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 421 (Fullam, J., concurring).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 419 (majority opinion); cf. Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student
Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113 (2010) (arguing that when
student speech triggers punishment school officials should be required to show that
they provided adequate prior notice of the rule invoked and of the potential
sanction and that the punishment imposed was reasonable).
341. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414.
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did not involve supporting the objectionable circus enterprise. By
appealing to her classmates to join her in voicing their concern for
the circus animals and objecting to the school’s chosen field trip, was
Amanda interjecting ideas that were unsuitable and disturbing for
young children? Was she threatening the ability of her classmates’
parents to protect them from inappropriate influences? Or was she,
to the alarm of school officials, introducing her fellow students to the
idea that they could identify an injustice —the infliction of physical
and emotional harm on confined wild animals—and challenge what
the children saw as a bad decision by school officials to support that
injustice? Allowing Amanda to distribute the stickers and coloring
books appears to negate the first two posited explanations for the
school officials’ actions, making the disquieting third option most
plausible and most consistent with the view first expressed by the
school district that elementary schools are inappropriate settings for
342
petition activities.
4. Experiencing citizenship in the classroom: Downs v. Conway
School District
Just as Pinard preserved a place for student petition activity in the
343
high school setting, Downs v. Conway School District, a case decided
shortly after Tinker, illustrates that petitioning for redress of
grievances can be affirmed as a vital, constructive part of an
elementary school student’s education for citizenship. In Downs, a
second grade teacher had been dismissed after she and her young
344
pupils sought several changes in school operations.
In the first
incident, the teacher gave the principal drawings some of her
students had made in art class. The children had been instructed to
draw their classmates, conveying what they were feeling. Several
students drew pictures of other children lying down, asking for water.
Others drew wilted flowers. These images expressed the children’s
frustration that their water fountain had been broken for many
345
weeks.
Later, after studying about food and nutrition, a student
proposed writing a letter to the cafeteria supervisor asking for raw
rather than cooked carrots in order to maximize the nutritional value
342. See Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing the
district counsel’s letter, which stated: “Elementary schools are not generally the
environment for petition circulation, particularly where parents are totally unaware
of such activities. It is incumbent upon school authorities, particularly in an
elementary school setting, to preserve an appropriate environment focused on the
institution’s instructional objectives”).
343. 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
344. Id. at 342.
345. Id. at 339–42.
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of their school lunches. A class workbook had suggested an initiative
346
as part of the curriculum unit. Members of the class prepared and
signed a simple letter and asked for the teacher to sign with them,
347
which she did. The letter was mailed to the cafeteria supervisor but
also drew the attention of the superintendent. During the period in
which her students were voicing their concerns about their water
fountain and their cafeteria fare, Ms. Downs had repeatedly
complained to her principal and superintendent about the health
and safety hazard posed by the operation of an open burning
incinerator, which stood in the center of the school playground and
ran throughout the school day. The incinerator emitted smoke,
which sickened children and adults in the school, including Ms.
Downs and some of her second graders. In addition, dangerous
debris fell from the incinerator. Some children would be drawn to
these burned and rusted materials, and others would sometimes try
to ignite sticks or branches by inserting them into the incinerator
during recess.
Citing this series of events as instances of
“insubordination,” “lack of cooperation with the administration,”
and “teaching second graders to protest,” the school board, acting
on the basis of the superintendent’s recommendation, refused to
renew the teacher’s contract and ended her more than twenty-five
348
years as, in her principal’s description, “a master teacher.”
To
support his recommendation, the superintendent had invoked a
Board of Education policy forbidding the circulation of petitions
349
without the approval of the school superintendent.
Reviewing Ms. Downs’ First Amendment challenge to her dismissal,
the district court observed that “the superintendent demanded blind
obedience to any directive he gave whether illegal, unconstitutional,
arbitrary or capricious,” ignoring the legitimate character of all of
the complaints and the orderly and restrained manner in which they
350
were conveyed.
Allowing the teacher to be fired under these
circumstances would, the court concluded, threaten the school’s
ability to credibly convey an appreciation of basic constitutional
351
principles. Furthermore, the school district’s own policies exhorted
its teachers to “demonstrate the principles of democracy at all times
in the operation of [their] classroom[s;] thereby providing each child
with the opportunity to develop from actual experience a real
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 343, 346.
Id. at 350 (citing text of the Board of Education’s District Policy III.F.4e).
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352

understanding of the democratic way of life.”
Consequently, the
court ruled that the school district could not dismiss a teacher simply
because she and her students sought to remediate problems at their
353
school. The court saw through the purported justifications used to
obscure the superintendent’s real motivation for firing Ms. Downs —
his desire to squelch all criticism about his failure to ensure a safe
354
and healthy school environment.
C. The Heightened Hazards of Overly Restrictive Reactions: The
Implications of Pearson and Garcetti
The outcomes in Lowery and Walker-Serrano were not inevitable
under available precedent and should not be treated as the
appropriate balancing of student rights and institutional needs. The
significance of these flawed rulings extends beyond the litigants and
students in the school districts within the relevant judicial circuits.
Although contrary precedent offering protection of similar student
expression exists, the Supreme Court’s recently revised qualified
immunity jurisprudence increases the likelihood of repressive
responses to students’ controversial or critical speech. In Pearson v.
355
Callahan, the Supreme Court abandoned the analytical sequence
356
prescribed by Saucier v. Katz as the template for the evaluation of
officials’ claims of qualified immunity from personal liability in cases
357
alleging violations of constitutional rights.
Saucier’s protocol
required a court to first examine whether the facts alleged or shown
by the plaintiff made out a constitutional violation and then, if such a
violation was found, to discern if the right had been clearly
358
established when the challenged official conduct occurred.
Liability could be imposed only when the right asserted is “clearly
established,” a standard that the Court has explained will not be met
in the absence of confirming precedents from the controlling
jurisdiction at the time of the challenged conduct or “a consensus of
cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable [official] could
359
not have believed that his actions were lawful.”
A circuit split on
the relevant constitutional question would also rebut the assertion
352. Id.
353. Id. at 348.
354. See id. at 346 (identifying the “real cause of friction” as the plaintiff’s
criticism of the superintendent).
355. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
356. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
357. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
358. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
359. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
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360

that a right was clearly established.
The Court has recognized,
however, that “a general constitutional rule already identified in the
decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct
in question” even without a prior ruling specifically addressing the
361
practice at issue.
The Saucier sequence reflected concern that “were a court simply
to skip ahead to the question whether the law was clearly established”
362
the elaboration of constitutional principles could be thwarted.
Although noting that the Saucier two-step process “promote[d] the
development of constitutional precedent,” the unanimous Pearson
Court yielded to complaints from lower courts about the expenditure
of scarce judicial resources on difficult interpretive questions that
could have no effect on the actual outcome of a case against officials
and concluded that lower courts should have the discretion to
363
dispense with Saucier’s first prong.
This option, attractive to lower
courts straining under heavy caseloads, foreseeably inhibits the
correction of officials’ misunderstandings of the nature of
constitutional protections.
In Pearson’s wake, rulings like Lowery and Walker-Serrano allow
school officials to reasonably project that they will be shielded from
personal liability when they react repressively to student petition and
364
protest activity at school.
With the liability disincentive removed,
school officials may see little downside to firmly and swiftly shutting
down student challenges to policies and practices students identify as
unfair or dysfunctional.
Acknowledging students as a potentially vital source of
information about school efficacy and fairness makes facilitating
and protecting student speech a necessary component of school
accountability and improvement. Like teachers, students can offer
an insider’s perspective on school life. The imperative to create and
maintain mechanisms for students to present school-related
grievances acquires particular urgency due to the shadow the
Supreme Court’s current approach to the protection of public

360. Id. at 618.
361. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002) (citing United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
362. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
363. Id.
364. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Cases Will Face New Hurdles, A.B.A. J.
(Feb. 1, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_new
_hurdles_for_civil_rights_cases (describing how, to overcome a qualified immunity
defense, the Supreme Court has begun requiring a case on point that demonstrates
that the Plaintiff’s right was clearly established when violated).
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employee speech has cast over teachers’ willingness to air
365
complaints about school operations.
Under the analysis articulated in Garcetti v. Ceballos, “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
366
communications from employer discipline.”
Continuing to retreat
from the quality of First Amendment protection once available to
public employees speaking on “matters of public concern,” such as
367
possible governmental misconduct, Justice Kennedy concluded in
Garcetti that a Los Angeles County deputy district attorney could not
challenge allegedly retaliatory actions taken by his supervisors after a
memorandum recommending the dismissal of criminal charges in
368
light of irregularities in the procurement of a key search warrant.
Although some teachers’ First Amendment retaliation claims
stemming from complaints about problematic school practices or
369
administrator wrongdoing have survived in the post-Garcetti era,
365. For assessments of the risks that Garcetti creates for teachers and other school
employees who voice concerns about school practices, see Richard T. Geisel &
Brenda R. Kallio, Employee Speech in K–12 Settings: The Impact of Garcetti on First
Amendment Retaliation Claims, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 20 (2010); Martha M. McCarthy &
Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public
School Educators, 17 IN PUB. INTEREST 209 (2008); and Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher:
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 1281, 1321–42 (2008). For
an examination of Garcetti’s impact in the special education context, see Gina K.
DePietro & Perry A. Zirkel, Employee Special Education Advocacy: Retaliation Claims
Under the First Amendment, Section 504 and the ADA, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 823 (2010),
noting that teachers and other school employees may be able to obtain relief under
provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) that confer protection from retaliation on persons attempting to protect
the rights of people with disabilities.
366. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
367. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569–70 (1968).
368. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. Garcetti’s reasoning has been widely criticized. See
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (describing how Garcetti
“under-protects public employee speech that is vital to self-government”); Helen
Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 31 (2009) (arguing that Garcetti leaves public
employees unprotected when they report safety hazards, ethical lapses, and other
government misconduct and should only be used to limit the free speech protections
of employees hired to convey specific viewpoints that are clearly recognizable as
“governmental in origin”); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 117 (2008)
(concluding the ruling makes “it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to
speak out in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers”).
369. See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1206
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding that teachers spoke as citizens addressing matters of public
concern when, as part of meetings with parents and other members of the public,
they discussed how a charter school’s code of employee conduct limited employees’
speech and associational rights and whether the school’s charter would be renewed);
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many others, including claims arising from the identification of
potentially serious misconduct or the failure to meet legal obligations
to vulnerable students, have been doomed by the application of
370
371
Garcetti. Until Garcetti is reconsidered or refined, teachers’ efforts
to expose school dysfunction will remain a hazardous enterprise few
372
may be bold enough to undertake.
Corbett v. Duerring, 780 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489, 493 (S.D. W. Va. 2011) (finding that a
vice principal’s allegations that he was pressured to apply lenient discipline to
children of “persons of influence” was the speech of a citizen on a matter of public
concern when he made the remarks during a protest while suspended from office);
Sherrod v. Sch. Bd., 703 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that a
teacher’s repeated appearances before the school board to address the district’s
deficient implementation of statutorily mandated inclusion of African and AfricanAmerican history in the social studies curriculum could qualify as citizens’ speech on
a matter of public concern because the teacher testified about district policy matters
beyond the scope of his teaching duties and spoke as parent and taxpayer), rev’d per
curiam on other grounds, 667 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2012).
370. See, e.g., Massaro v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-2721-CV, 2012 WL
1948772, at *2 (2d Cir. May 31, 2012) (finding that a teacher’s complaints about
sanitary conditions and a potential health hazard in a shared classroom arose out of
her duties as an employee, precluding First Amendment protection); Fox v. Traverse
City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
teacher’s complaint to supervisors that the size of her teaching caseload prevented
her from providing appropriate services to special education students was not
protected by the First Amendment because it was made as part of her performance
of teaching responsibilities); Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir.
2010) (concluding that a fifth grade teacher’s filing of union grievance about the
principal’s failure to discipline a student who threw a book at the teacher in a
classroom was unprotected under Garcetti because it addressed conditions related to
the teacher’s essential instructional duties); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480
F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (ruling that a school athletic director’s
memos seeking information about money missing from an athletic account were not
protected under the First Amendment because they addressed matters related to his
job duties); Condiff v. Hart Cnty. Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 2d 876, 889 (W.D. Ky. 2011)
(reasoning that a teacher’s report of an allegation that another teacher sexually
harassed her step-daughter was not entitled to First Amendment protection because
the teacher, as part of her job duties, was obligated under the school sexual
harassment policy to relay any such allegations to the school administration); Morey
v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 06 Civ. 1877(PGG), 2010 WL 1047622, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2010) (deciding that a head custodian’s complaints to the district
administrators about possible asbestos contamination in a high school gym were
unprotected because they were made in furtherance of his core employment
responsibilities), aff’d, 410 F. App’x 398 (2d Cir. 2011).
371. See Lyle Denniston, Free Speech Issue Bypassed, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 12:23
p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/free-speech-issue-bypassed/ (noting that
by denying certiorari petitions seeking review of Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir.
2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012), and Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 653 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636
(2012), the Court evaded opportunities to reconsider the reach of Garcetti).
372. Teachers in some areas may be able to invoke the protection of state
whistleblower laws when they seek to expose problems in schools. See Brenda R.
Kallio & Richard T. Geisel, To Speak or not to Speak: Applying Garcetti and
Whistleblower Laws to Public School Employee Speech, 264 EDUC. L. REP. 517, 531–32
(2011) (describing variable scope of such state laws and identifying procedural
prerequisites, such as the presentation of the issue to a supervisor, that may inhibit
teachers’ use of this mode of protection).
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IV. MAKING ROOM FOR STUDENT DISSENT AT SCHOOL
When school officials and reviewing courts regard student speech
seeking change at school as a threat to the accomplishment of the
instructional mission, they ignore both the educational opportunity
offered by this kind of student dissent and its constitutional value. To
counteract this repressive reflex, this Article presents two
recommendations. First, schools must be persuaded to reframe their
understanding of their instructional mission. To educate children
for citizenship, the essential objective of a civics curriculum, schools
should ensure that their instructional program includes a
participatory dimension. Second, courts should reinforce schools’
adherence to a properly articulated civic education agenda by
applying more rigorous scrutiny to schools’ attempts to suppress or
punish student dissent seeking change in school policies or practices.
A. New Norms for Educators: Adopting a Capabilities Approach, Assuming
a Fiduciary Role
Given the consistent emphasis on the added value of including a
participatory component in schools’ civic education program, the
analysis of student dissenters’ invocation of First Amendment
protection might be constructively reshaped by drawing on Martha
Nussbaum’s capabilities-oriented approach to the interpretation of
373
constitutional rights. Anchored in a commitment to respecting the
dignity of each person, the Capabilities Approach presses an
exploration of what people are “able to do and to be” and the
attendant investigation of what social and political obligations should
properly be enforced in order to offer each person sufficient
374
opportunity to achieve her human potential.
A Capabilities
Approach invites careful attention to how constitutional principles
and their interpretation have promoted or impeded people’s abilities
to function in some central areas of human life, asking, “[d]oes the
interpretation of constitutional entitlements yield real abilities to
choose and act, or are the constitution’s promises more like hollow
375
verbal gestures?” In Nussbaum’s account, the normative essence of
the Capabilities Approach, although recently ignored by Roberts
373. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term —Foreword: Constitutions
and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56–95
(2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities]. For a sustained
exploration of the content of a Capabilities Approach and its implications in the
formation of public policy, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011).
374. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 373, at 5–6.
375. Id. at 6.
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Court majorities, has animated judicial reasoning and advanced
constitutional understanding in some of the Supreme Court’s most
376
Evaluating the respective
significant and controversial rulings.
constitutional prerogatives of the student critic and school officials
through the lens of a Capabilities Approach could clarify what is at
stake when student dissent is stifled.
In recent work with Rosalind Dixon, Professor Nussbaum has
identified how adopting a capabilities-oriented analytical approach
377
could improve the understanding of children’s rights claims.
Dixon and Nussbaum clarify how recognizing specific rights for
children might be justified so as to demonstrate appropriate
sensitivity to children’s needs and vulnerabilities as well as their often
378
overlooked capacity for agency.
Dixon and Nussbaum draw on
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit’s explanation of the concept of
corrosive disadvantage to explain why children’s rights claims should
379
be afforded special priority. Wolff and de-Shalit identify what they
label as corrosive forms of disadvantage which both inflict present
380
damage and precipitate other capability failures in the future.
Dixon and Nussbaum focus on how certain forms of material
deprivation, such as malnutrition, could subject children to corrosive
disadvantage by undermining their physical health and mental
development —outcomes inconsistent with respect for the dignity of
381
children as persons. Dixon and Nussbaum then project the future
hazards this kind of children’s disadvantage could create for the
larger society in which they live when, for example malnourished
children’s impaired cognitive development threatens to diminish
their future employability and their ability to perform their civic
382
responsibilities, such as voting.
Denying children participatory and expressive opportunities in
school could create problematic citizenship skills deficits for
children. Such deficits threaten children both in their present and
376. Id. at 56–73 (explaining how the Courts’ rulings in cases such as Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), reveal the implicit adoption of a Capabilities Approach).
377. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a Capabilities
Approach: The Question of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553 (2012).
378. Id. at 553.
379. Id. at 580.
380. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 121 (2007). Wolff and
de-Shalit contrast “corrosive disadvantages” with “fertile functionings,” abilities that,
once acquired or developed, establish a foundation for the acquisition of other
desirable skills or attributes. Id. at 138.
381. Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 377, at 580–81.
382. Id. at 582–83.
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future lives, thwarting their acquisition of a civic voice and depleting
383
For
their motivation to participate in collective problem-solving.
children living in historically disenfranchised and neglected
communities, opportunities to express concerns and to affect change
at school may be particularly critical. Such opportunities offer a
glimpse of a responsive civic world and sustain students’ faith in the
384
possibility of democratic governance and in their own capacity to
385
act as agents of reform.
Moreover, short-circuiting students’ efforts to challenge perceived
inequity or dysfunction at school could inhibit rather than enhance
institutional functioning in at least two ways. First, if school officials
exhibit a reflexively repressive response when students question
them, these officials fail to conform to constitutional democracy’s
expectation that authority can be subject to challenge and that those
wielding authority should answer such challenges by presenting
reasoned justifications rather than insisting on automatic
386
deference.
This potentially alienates students from their school
387
Second, simply
and undermines their faith in public institutions.
shutting down student dissent by equating such speech with
unacceptable disruption also cuts off access to the information
388
resource students represent. Students are an underutilized source
389
of “critical local knowledge,”
and their aired concerns and
grievances offer data about both a school’s climate and practices.

383. MEIRA LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN LEFT BEHIND 192, 197–98 (2012) [hereinafter
LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN].
384. Id. at 195.
385. Id. at 226 (noting the power of such experiences in counteracting too
frequently propagated images of low income students of color as “bundles of deficits
who traumatize the community via academic failure, idleness, and even criminal
delinquency;” such images distort both the broader society’s view of such youth and,
perhaps even more tragically, such youths’ view of themselves).
386. See Constance A. Flanagan et al., School and Community Climates and Civic
Commitments: Patterns for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
421, 422, 428–29 (2007) (arguing that “young people’s confidence in the system
occurs via the accumulated experience of fair (due) process and responsive
interactions with adult authorities,” and subsequently, “[t]he kinds of public spaces
our schools and communities provide and the behaviors of adults in those settings
communicate to the younger generation what it means to be part of the body politic
and to what extent principles of inclusion, fairness and justice figure in that
process”).
387. See William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic
Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 217, 220 (2001) (describing young people’s lack of
confidence in “public institutions whose operations they regard as remote, opaque,
and virtually impossible to control”).
388. See supra Part II (discussing how free exchange among students can benefit
school officials and other students).
389. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 227 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Invigorating the protection of student dissent at school would also
be a part of an overdue effort to integrate children into operative
regimes of political accountability. As Ethan Leib and David Ponet
have explained, democracies’ failure to grapple with children’s status
as the “orphans of political theory” undermines governmental
390
Although repeatedly affirming their
credibility and legitimacy.
commitment to principles of inclusion and representation,
constitutional democracies such as the United States persistently
evade the challenge of translating those principles into practice for
children.
Leib and Ponet propose that fiduciary principles could yield new
insights into the practical demands of such governmental
391
commitments.
Charged to act in the beneficiaries’ best interest, a
fiduciary must “actively seek to understand what the beneficiary
392
herself prioritizes” and adhere to a “dialogic imperative.”
Although able to draw on relevant experience and expertise in
making decisions affecting the beneficiary, the fiduciary must exhibit
respect for beneficiary interests and preferences, and such respect
will be best manifested in “a true willingness to listen and be
393
responsive” to the beneficiary’s views.
Stepping beyond
“perfunctory consultation,” the fiduciary should actually talk with the
beneficiary, maintaining an attitude of sincere openness to what can
394
be learned from what the beneficiary says.
The fiduciary must
“actively work[] to discover, investigate, and engage” the
395
beneficiary’s preferences. This process may not ultimately require
conforming to the beneficiary’s preferred course, but it nonetheless
396
Leib and Ponet describe
establishes a foundation of earned trust.
this duty as one of “deliberative engagement” and use it as the
397
guidepost for political reform to realize children’s citizenship.
They specifically recommend that governments create mechanisms to
facilitate this kind of authentic exchange with children and identify
398
the use of institutional ombudsmen as one such viable mechanism.

390. Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative
Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178, 178 (2012).
391. Id. at 179.
392. Id. at 180 (using “dialogic imperative” to mean a public servant’s duty to
enter into dialogue with child-beneficiaries in order to discern their views and
preferences).
393. Id. at 180, 189–90.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 180.
396. Id. at 185–86.
397. Id. at 190.
398. Id. at 192–98.
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In this role the ombudsman would have “affirmative duties to talk to
399
children and create deliberative fora to engage them.”
Applying Leib and Ponet’s conceptual model to the public school
context reveals the immanent fiduciary character of the roles of
teachers and administrators with regard to their students’ developing
constitutional capacities, including their capacity to dissent as they
identify injustice and call for the correction of governmental
dysfunction. In order for students to exercise and cultivate their
capabilities as dissenters, schools should create and preserve channels
for student expression, including student petition and protest, and
courts should protect such expression through the application of
appropriately tailored legal standards.
Adopting a more dissent-receptive approach would reflect an
aspiration to create what Philip Cook has described as “the just
400
school.”
Cook finds flaws in what he describes as a liberal view of
how schools should treat children, a view that focuses on the child as
future adult, as well as in what he describes as the liberationist view of
children, which can mistakenly regard the child as being the same as
401
an adult.
Cook argues that what is owed children as a matter of
justice cannot be properly assessed by treating the experience of
childhood only in terms of its instrumental value to the children’s
402
future adulthood. The significance of schools’ effects on children’s
present lives should not be overlooked, and an appreciation of
childhood as “a stage of development that includes a political
403
dimension” requires careful scrutiny of how schools treat children.
While in school, children engage in what should be recognizable as
political relations with other children and with adults at school —
adults who, in public schools, act on behalf of the state. As they
interact with their peers and supervising adults, children are
undertaking political practices and exploring what relevant values,
such as fairness and accountability, demand at school.
The
encounters and exchanges with others at school constitute what Cook
terms a “dynamic relationship;” children are guided and influenced
by the adults around them, and children potentially influence the
399. Id. at 194; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children’s
Participation in Policy Formation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 754–59 (2003) (describing
strategies for involving children and youth in the development and implementation
of government policies affecting them).
400. Philip Cook, The Just School 1, 3, 29–44 (Econ. & Soc. Research Council,
Working Paper, Grant Ref. RES-000-22-3228), available at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/myesrc/grants/RES-000-22-3228/outputs/read/686f6ea8-1b7b-4a64-9b0e-df7cca6a3c7e.
401. Id. at 10.
402. Id. at 6.
403. Id. at 11.
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adults and other children in the school, contributing to “their own
progressive moral development” and to the improvement of the
404
These interactive exchanges should, Cook
shared community.
counsels, be conducted with sensitivity to children’s emergent
capabilities, including their capacity for moral agency, and children’s
405
simultaneous vulnerabilities as they progress toward maturity. The
reality of these vulnerabilities for children generally at certain stages
of development and for specific children due to their individual
circumstances creates the need for adult supervision, guidance, and,
406
at times, discipline and the imposition of limitations.
However,
appropriate responses to children should be grounded in knowledge
about the children involved and in respect for children as persons.
Cook calls for recognition of the school as a “child-specific political
407
institution,” and argues that the school should be obligated to
“serve the political interests of children qua children by providing the
freedoms, resources, and opportunities for children to engage in
political relations with other children and adults, free from threats of
408
harm to those political relations.” Denying the child opportunities
to air grievances and concerns and to have the experience of
receiving a respectful and reasoned response at school would be an
example of such a threat.
B. Reframing Schools’ Instructional Agenda to Protect the Student Critic:
Civic Education’s Participatory Imperative
Amidst increasing concern about youth disengagement from
politics and demonstrated deficiencies in public school students’
409
knowledge about the rudiments of our constitutional system,
renewed attention has recently been directed at constructing an
410
effective civic education agenda for America’s public schools.
In
404. Id.
405. Id. at 11–12.
406. Id. at 15. Constraints can therefore be properly imposed on children when
they lack required competencies or when they want to pursue activities associated
with documented long-term harms to themselves or others, harms that the children
cannot reliably weigh or mitigate.
407. Id. at 32.
408. Id. at 44.
409. See, e.g., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., CIVICS 2010:
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS AT GRADES 4, 8, AND 12, at 8 (2011),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2010/2011466.pdf
(reporting that only 27% of fourth grade students performed at or above the
Proficient level in 2010 testing and only two percent earned Advanced scores).
410. See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHS., GUARDIAN OF
DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS (2011), available at http://civicmission.s3
.amazonaws.com/118/f0/5/171/1/Guardian-of-Democracy-report.pdf (last visited
Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY REPORT] (providing policy

BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

316

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2013 1:37 PM

[Vol. 62:253

their influential report, The Civic Mission of Schools, the Carnegie
Corporation, and the Center for Information and Research on Civic
Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) stress the unique and critical
role public schools play in preparing youth to perform the duties of
citizenship but bemoan the dramatic narrowing of civic education
411
Schools increasingly offer only a course that addresses
offerings.
government in abstract terms “with little explicit discussion of a
412
citizen’s role.”
Citing the cultivation of civic skills and attitudes as a primary
413
impetus for the creation of our public school system,
the
Carnegie/CIRCLE report underscores that among all public
institutions, “schools are the most systematically and directly
414
responsible for imparting citizen norms.”
Schools shape students’
attitudes, beliefs, and habits as citizens most powerfully through their
daily practices. The “models of civic community” students encounter
at school trigger foreseeable responses: “[Students] learn when to
stay quiet and how to fly under the radar, and they learn when—and
415
Inspired by John Dewey’s
with whom—they can speak up.”
416
educational ethos, schools can serve as civic laboratories where
students test out their own understandings of citizenship while
recommendations and best practices in civic learning). The report was prepared by
the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools in partnership with the Leonore
Annenberg Institute for Civics of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the
University of Pennsylvania, the National Conference on Citizenship, the Center for
Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement at Tufts University,
and the American Bar Association Division for Public Education.
411. C ARNEGIE C ORP . OF N.Y. & CIRCLE: C TR . FOR I NFO . & R ESEARCH ON
C IVIC L EARNING & E NGAGEMENT , T HE C IVIC M ISSION OF S CHOOLS 12–16 (2003),
available at http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/CivicMissionofSchools.pdf
[hereinafter CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT].
412. Id. at 14.
413. Id. at 11. The CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT notes that many state constitutions
explicitly link the provision of public education with preparation for the
responsibilities of citizenship. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement”); IND.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual,
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and
uniform system of Common Schools . . . .”); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The
stability of a republican form of government depending upon the intelligence of the
people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of
public schools.”).
414. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 12.
415. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 175.
416. John Dewey conceptualized the public school as “a miniature community, an
embryonic society.” JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND THE
CURRICULUM 18 (1990).
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assessing how the adults at school translate the meaning of
citizenship and governance.
The Carnegie/CIRCLE Report then projects a capacity-building
and practice-oriented agenda for civic education that will enable
students “to be competent and responsible citizens throughout their
417
To set the agenda for a revitalized program of civic
lives.”
education, the report offers this inventory of relevant attributes and
capacities for “[c]ompetent and responsible citizens”:
[They] are informed and thoughtful. They have a grasp and an
appreciation of history and the fundamental processes of American
democracy; an understanding and awareness of public and
community issues; an ability to obtain information when needed; a
capacity to think critically; and a willingness to enter into dialogue
with others about different points of view and to understand
diverse perspectives. They are tolerant of ambiguity and resist
simplistic answers to complex questions.
[They] participate in their communities. They belong to and
contribute to groups in civil society that offer venues for Americans
to participate in public service, work together to overcome
problems, and pursue an array of cultural, social, political, and
religious interests and beliefs.
[They] act politically. They have the skills, knowledge, and
commitment needed to accomplish public purposes—for instance,
by organizing people to address social issues, solving problems in
groups, speaking in public, petitioning and protesting to influence
public policy, and voting.
[They] have moral and civic virtues. They are concerned for the
rights and welfare of others, are socially responsible, willing to
listen to alternative perspectives, confident in their capacity to
make a difference, and ready to contribute personally to civic and
political action. They strike a reasonable balance between their
own interests and the common good. They recognize the
importance of and practice civic duties such as voting and
418
respecting the rule of law.

The work of civic education advocates and the research of scholars
who have examined the components of civic education initiatives
consistently confirm that an effective instructional program should
419
include a participatory dimension. A passive, inculcative approach
to citizenship education that offers students only abstract civics
417. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 10.
418. Id.
419. See id. at 16 (identifying the creation of opportunities for students to
participate in school governance as among the most promising approaches to
civic education).
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lessons or a purely observational perspective on citizens’ critical
engagement with government will likely be less effective in fostering
420
students’ “will and skill” to play an active role in civic life.
Moreover, an educational environment that gives adolescents an
experience of efficacy when they participate in school life has been
identified as a significant predictor of whether U.S. students report
421
that they expect to vote as an adult. This kind of school experience
may be particularly important for students from economically and
socially disadvantaged communities and from constituencies with a
422
history of political disempowerment.
Establishing more avenues for students to participate in school
governance and institutional improvement would track the trajectory
of international human rights law’s effort to redefine the nature of
governmental obligations to children and the content of children’s
citizenship. Moving beyond initial efforts to establish governmental
423
duties to provide for and to protect children, Article 12 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly
endorses affording children opportunities to participate in
424
governance.
Although the United States has not ratified the

420. See James Youniss et al., What We Know About Engendering Civic Identity, 40 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTISTS 620, 620 (1997) (confirming that students whose education has
included a participatory component, such as involvement in student government or
service learning activities, are more likely to exhibit a civic identity characterized by
“individual and collective senses of social agency, responsibility for society, and
political-moral awareness”). See generally JAMES YOUNISS & MIRANDA YATES, COMMUNITY
SERVICE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN YOUTH: THEORY AND POLICY (1997) (exploring
the nexus between community service and construction of adolescent self-identity);
Miranda Yates & James Youniss, Community Service and Political-Moral Identity in
Adolescents, 6 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 271 (1996) (employing empirical analysis to
prove how community service affects students’ development of civic identity).
421. Judith Torney-Purta & Jo-Ann Amadeo, A Cross-National Analysis of Political
and Civic Involvement Among Adolescents, 36 POL. SCI. & POL. 269, 271 (2003).
422. See PETER LEVINE, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY: DEVELOPING THE NEXT
GENERATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS 131 (2007) (noting the positive impact of
increased civic knowledge among students in schools with poor educational
outcomes); LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 175 (emphasizing that students
inevitably model and practice the norms exhibited by their schools, whether positive
or negative).
423. See Mary John, Voicing: Research and Practice with the ‘Silenced,’ in CHILDREN IN
CHARGE: THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 3, 3–6 (Mary John ed., 1996)
(describing how recognition of children’s participatory rights during revision of the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child reflected an evolving understanding of
children as citizens rather than as only dependent members of a society).
424. Article 12 reads as follows: “States Parties shall assure to the child who is
capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.” U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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425

Convention, its provisions offer a valuable affirmation of the
necessity of adding a participatory dimension to our understanding
426
of children’s constitutional rights.
To demonstrate a commitment to offering students opportunities
to practice the skills of citizenship, schools must welcome student
perspectives on problems facing the school community. Adopting
such a receptive stance may not inevitably result in the adoption of
students’ preferences or recommendations as school policy, but it will
greatly enhance the legitimacy of official decision-making. Such
receptivity encompasses making a place for student petition and
protest within a participatory civic education model, a proposition
endorsed by retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
who has been at the forefront of the campaign for the revitalization
of public schools’ efforts to prepare students for the responsibilities
427
of citizenship.
In a 2009 speech to a joint session of the Florida legislature, shortly
after Florida had enacted legislation mandating that civics education
begin in middle school, Justice O’Connor emphasized public schools’
vital role in preparing youth for citizenship:
Self-government, which we have enjoyed in this country, cannot
survive unless people—our citizens—are willing to get engaged
and understand the commitments necessary to make democracy
work. It was for that very reason that public schools were created in
this country in the first place: to produce citizens who have the
knowledge and the skills and the values to sustain our form of
428
government, our democracy.
425. See David M. Smolin, A Tale of Two Treaties: Furthering Social Justice Through
the Redemptive Myths of Childhood, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 983 (2003)
(describing proffered explanations for U.S. reticence to ratify the Convention). Of
the UN member states, only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the
Convention. Id. at 973 n.11.
426. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s
Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 2 (1999) (describing the constructive influence of the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child on constitutional development across the globe but
acknowledging doctrinal and political barriers to incorporating understanding of
children’s rights expressed in the Convention into American constitutional law).
427. See Alexander Heffner, Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the
Importance of Civics Education, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/lifestyle/magazine/former-supreme-court-justice-sandra-day-oconnor-on-the-importance
-of-civics-education/2012/04/10/gIQA8aUnCT_story.html (reporting Justice
O’Connor’s launch of iCivics, a Web-based education project); Seth Schiesel, Former
Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at E7 (describing
Justice O’Connor’s work with Georgetown University Law Center and Arizona State
University, to develop the Our Courts website (www.ourcourts.org) with interactive
civics curriculum for middle school students).
428. Sandra Day O’Connor, Sandra Day O’Connor on Civics Education, J. JAMES
MADISON INST., Spring/Summer 2009, at 14–15.
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She then described civics education as an opportunity to teach
students how to improve their own communities, adding “it’s about
teaching students that one person can ignite political fires on the
ground, and those fires almost always begin with a very small
429
spark.”
Significantly, Justice O’Connor specifically praised the
efforts of Florida schoolchildren who, after learning about the Tinker
ruling through a civic education program, took aim at a problem
within their own school, staging a silent protest in the school cafeteria
in order to confront school officials about the poor quality of school
430
lunches. Justice O’Connor applauded the students’ initiative as the
“kind of engagement and proactive spirit [that] is exactly what civics
431
education is all about.”
As Justice O’Connor’s praise for the Florida schoolchildren’s
protest initiative suggests, the most effective education in
constitutional citizenship will go beyond the more traditional
transmission of relevant historical and political knowledge and have
an active, perhaps even confrontational, participatory component. As
the Carnegie/CIRCLE report prescribed, to offer effective
preparation to citizenship schools should “structure the school
environment and climate so that students are able to ‘live what they
432
learn’ about civic engagement and democracy.” To do this, schools
should create outlets for students to speak out about school
conditions and practices and offer students opportunities to see how
433
school policies are made.
School officials may be less than enthusiastic about
recommendations urging “meaningful student participation in
434
school governance,”
foreseeing the creation of channels for
students to air concerns and complaints about how the school
operates. Such apprehensions may explain why descriptions of
possible modes of participation have gravitated toward familiar and
often limited forms of student involvement, such as student council
activities. This reticence to offer students opportunities to address
problems arising in their classrooms, in their school, or in their
school district regrettably ignores research linking such opportunities
and the sense of personal efficacy they engender with students’
429. Id.
430. Id. at 16.
431. Id.
432. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 21.
433. Id.
434. See GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 410, at 33, 43 (identifying
student participation in school governance as a proven practice that enhances the
effectiveness of civic education programs).
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positive forecasts of their future civic involvement. Moreover, when
school officials resist creating outlets for students to air grievances
and concerns, they ignore the valuable informational resource
436
students’ observations about school functioning can provide and
they slight students’ genuine desire to contribute to school
437
improvement efforts.
Somewhat perplexingly, those calling for a reinvigorated program
of civic education that includes participatory opportunities have not
yet addressed a potentially controversial and challenging question:
How schools’ responses to student petition and protest that take aim
at school policies and practices could enhance or potentially detract
from the effective transmission of the practical demands of
constitutional commitments. This Article responds to that omission
and examines the elements of the constitutional analysis courts
should use to review schools’ restriction or punishment of this kind
of student dissent.
C. Revising the Applicable Legal Standard
Courts’ deferential review of school officials’ decisions to restrict or
even punish student expression has led some scholars to draw an
alarming parallel between the limited protection of student speech in
435. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 27; see also Constance A.
Flanagan & Nakesha Faison, Youth Civic Development: Implications of Research for Social
Policy and Programs, 15 SOC. POL’Y REP., no. 1, 2008, at 3–5 (explaining that students’
civic identities are rooted in their opportunities for civic involvement).
436. See Sam Dillon, What Works in the Classroom? Ask the Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2010, at A15 (presenting findings of a Gates Foundation study showing that
surveying students on teachers’ ability to keep order, maintain student interest, and
help students learn from mistakes provided assessments of teacher effectiveness that
closely tracked data from standardized test results); see also LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN,
supra note 383, at 224–30 (describing “action civics” initiatives undertaken by
programs such as the Mikva Challenge, the Hyde Square Task Force, and the
Philadelphia Student Union in which high school students identified a community
issue, conducted research, developed advocacy strategies, and prompted significant
changes in policy); Elizabeth Armstrong, Project 540: Students Seeking More than a
Revolution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2003, at 12 (describing civics education
initiatives at 250 U.S. high schools in which students generate action plans for school
and community improvement).
437. See, e.g., Celina Su, “Where Youth Have an Actual Voice”: Teenagers as Empowered
Stakeholders in School Reform, in GASTON ALONSO ET AL., OUR SCHOOLS SUCK: STUDENTS
TALK BACK TO A SEGREGATED NATION ON THE FAILURES OF URBAN EDUCATION 143, 143–
75 (2009) (describing effective student mobilizations to secure changes in school
policies regarding the subsidies for low-income students’ public transportation costs,
the provision of guidance counselors, and the use of force by school-based police);
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., VIRGINIA STUDENTS SPEAK OUT (2007), available at
http://www.virginia-organizing.org/sites/default/files/Obstacles2Opportunity-Final.pdf
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (presenting results from student group’s survey of district’s
high school population regarding “opportunity gaps” inhibiting academic success of
low income students, students with disabilities, students of color, and ESL learners).
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schools and the sharply curtailed speech prerogatives of prisoners
438
and members of the military. Although this Article has argued that
such deference is not inevitably prescribed by relevant Supreme
Court precedent, a new articulation of the legal standard courts
should apply when analyzing schools’ authority to curtail student
petition and protest could greatly enhance the effective protection of
student dissent.
If the expression of dissent and the presentation of grievances are
core prerogatives of constitutional citizenship, courts reviewing
students’ claims for First Amendment protection of petition or
protest activity at school must seriously consider the implications of
limiting students’ exercise of such prerogatives in an environment
putatively charged with providing citizenship education. To deflect
such claims, school officials should have to identify legitimate
differentiating characteristics of the student speakers or conditions in
the distinct institutional context—the school —to justify speech
limitations. Such justifications have, however, frequently been
broadly framed, taking the form of the categorical assertion, as in
Walker-Serrano, that students as a group lack the maturity, judgment,
or intellectual capacity either to levy valid criticisms or complaints
about school operations or to present such claims in a manner that
439
does not needlessly harm others. Another generalized defense has
been the claim, accepted in Lowery, that countenancing such student
speech would, as a general predictive matter, be more likely to
undermine respect for school officials’ authority than to have a
440
constructive impact on school functioning.
If reviewing courts identified an obligation to scrutinize the
restriction or punishment of student dissent so as to discourage a
reflexively repressive response by school officials, such officials would
expect to have to present carefully articulated, situation-specific
explanations of why limitations of student dissent, petition, and
protest could not be reconciled with daily school activities. In
addition, school officials would be required to demonstrate that

438. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 71 (2010) (examining problematic implications of judges’ use of comparisons
between operational needs of prisons and schools to justify restrictions on student
speech); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 441 (1999) (noting disturbing parallels in increasing judicial receptivity to
administrators’ claimed need for sweeping authority to restrict basic rights in prisons
and schools).
439. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003)).
440. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Lowery v. Euverrard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007)).

BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/10/2013 1:37 PM

INSIDE VOICES

323

alternative mechanisms were available for students to communicate
their concerns to school authorities and, potentially, to the public.
Ensuring that schools maintain appropriately dissent-receptive
environments requires re-examining the quality of judicial scrutiny
applied when school officials silence or punish student critics. This
Section urges courts to acknowledge the heightened vulnerability of
the student speaker who offers a critical perspective on school
functioning and to exhibit sensitivity to how schools’ and courts’
responses to student dissent can shape or deform students’
understanding of First Amendment commitments.
After examining how schools have restricted student speech
addressing highly charged topics or introducing controversial
perspectives, John Taylor has concluded that Tinker’s current formula
fails to offer student speakers adequate protection against purposeful
441
viewpoint discrimination.
The possibility that school officials’
adverse reactions to student speech may be predicated on viewpoint
hostility rather than valid institutional concerns will likely be
considerably greater when students air their complaints about school
operations, effectively targeting either the officials with the power to
restrict or punish the student critics or members of a larger
bureaucracy from whom such officials may fear retribution if they fail
to squelch student criticism.
To formulate his recommendations for modifications to the Tinker
standard to more reliably inhibit educators’ viewpoint discriminatory
442
restrictions of student speech, Taylor productively mines Elena
Kagan’s insight that First Amendment doctrine may be most
coherently understood as the Court’s effort to uncover improper
443
government motives for speech restrictions.
Kagan describes the
doctrinal approaches created and used by the Court as “tools to flush
444
out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.”
Kagan persuasively traces the possible genesis of this “motive445
hunting” project
to the Court’s apprehension “that the
government will err, as a result of self-interest or bias” when it acts to
446
curtail speech.
First Amendment rules advancing these concerns
441. John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569,
577, 591–95 (2009).
442. Taylor recommends altering the Tinker inquiry to require school officials to
show that challenged speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to remedy or prevent a
substantial disruption of the school environment. See id. at 608–23.
443. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 512.
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serve as “double proxies,” working to unearth unacceptable motives
and then to illuminate problematic effects on public discourse and
447
community governance. Kagan regards this analytical method as a
plausible rendition of the demands of a crucial strand within
American political theory:
The democratic project is one of constant collective selfdetermination; expressive activity is the vehicle through which a
sovereign citizenry engages in this process by mediating diverse
views on the appropriate nature of the community. Were the
government to limit speech based on its sense of which ideas have
merit, it would expropriate an authority not intended for it and
negate a critical aspect of self-government. Democracy demands
that sovereign citizens, through each generation, retain authority
to evaluate competing visions and their adherents—to decide
which ideas and officials merit approval. Hence democracy bars
the government from restricting speech (as it also bars the
government from limiting the franchise) on the ground that such
activity will challenge reigning beliefs or incumbent officials. The
government must treat all ideas as contingent, because subject to
never-ending popular scrutiny. On this view, the prohibition of
certain motives again serves as a way to delineate the proper sphere
of authority, hereby preventing a democratic state from
contravening key principles of self-government and thereby
448
undermining its foundation.

The failure to adopt an analytical framework with the sensitivity to
detect possible improper motives by government decision-makers,
motives that could thwart rather than facilitate the achievement of
operational objectives, has been a serious deficiency in what has been
described as “the emerging First Amendment law of managerial
449
prerogative,” an approach manifested in recent decisions such as
Garcetti v. Ceballos but also identifiable in the Supreme Court’s
450
student speech cases. Lawrence Rosenthal has argued that the First
Amendment can tolerate the imposition of some restraints on speech
in governmental enterprises because such limitations “ensure[] that
447. Id. at 509–10.
448. Id. at 513–14.
449. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 86–93 (2008). Rosenthal’s effort to explain and
defend some governmental authority to limit speech draws on Robert Post’s work
illuminating how the Supreme Court’s introduction of a distinction between
government acting as sovereign or regulator and government acting as manager had
reshaped First Amendment doctrine. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 234–67 (1995) (arguing that the differences
between governance and management theories track closely with distinctions created
between treatment of speech in public and nonpublic forums, respectively).
450. Rosenthal, supra note 449, at 93–95.
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political officials have effective control over the functioning of public
offices—and therefore are fairly held politically accountable for the
451
However, Rosenthal qualifies his
operations of those offices.”
endorsement of the managerial prerogative justification for speech
restrictions, noting that its use to pursue some governmental
452
objectives would not be regarded as legitimate.
As examples of
improper objectives pursued through managerial control over
speech, Rosenthal identifies the enforcement of ideological
453
454
conformity through loyalty oaths or patronage regimes as well as
the punishment of employees speaking as citizens, not as employees,
455
on a matter of public concern. This attempt to differentiate proper
from improper bases for a claimed managerial need to control
speech corroborates the Kagan intuition that the motive for the
government’s restriction often plays a submerged but critical role in
the assessment of its authority to regulate speech. If, for example,
the government acts on the basis of a motive detached from
appropriate concerns such as the promotion of program efficacy, the
foundation for its assertion of a need for managerial control of
speech dissolves.
As recent work by scholars at the Cultural Cognition Project (CCP)
demonstrates, the extent to which observers interpret the actions of
protesters or dissenting speakers as posing a threat to public order
varies significantly depending on whether those observers regard the
456
protesters as sharing or challenging their cultural outlooks. These
experimental results reveal the power of cultural cognition, a kind of
“motivated reasoning that promotes congruence between a person’s
defining group commitments, on the one hand, and his or her
457
perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.”
The CCP
451. Id. at 34.
452. Id. at 39.
453. Id. at 65–66.
454. Id. at 66.
455. Id. (referencing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
456. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw A Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012). In the study, 202 participants
were asked to view silent video footage of demonstrators outside of what they were
told was either an abortion clinic or a military recruitment center, prompting the
participants to ascribe to the protesters (whose signs were obscured) either an antiabortion stance or a message opposing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Id. at 869–71, 873.
“The study focused on the lawfulness of police action to halt a political
demonstration for allegedly obstructing, threatening, or intimidating members of
the public.” Id. at 862. If the associated position of protesters differed from the
observers’ worldviews, identified through previously administered surveys, the
observers were more likely to report that the police response was justified. Id. at
878–80.
457. Id. at 859. The CCP scholars explain that cultural cognition arises from the
experience of “identity threat”:
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researchers’ findings show how these perceptions have the potential
to be legally consequential, particularly in First Amendment cases in
which the constitutionality of government action turns on an
evaluation of whether the government acted to maintain necessary
public order or merely invoked the responsibility for maintaining
order to mask the suppression of disquieting but not disruptive
458
dissent. Discerning how the legal system could minimize the effects
of cultural cognition’s problematic distortions in judgment is a
459
However, one modest and defensible strategy
complex challenge.
in this specific student speech context, cases involving students’
criticism of school operations, would be to evaluate school officials’
disciplinary response by proceeding with an inquiry built out of the
approach developed to resolve First Amendment retaliation claims,
460
an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit’s method in Pinard.
By
undertaking a more demanding review of schools’ reactions to
student dissent, courts would exert a disciplining influence on
educators, teaching both school officials and students that our claims
461
of allegiance to First Amendment norms have credibility.
The censoring or punishment of a student-critic should trigger
more careful interrogation of school officials’ motivation, an inquiry
performed with less deference and more skepticism than the
application of Tinker’s disruption test has generally triggered. This
inquiry could, of course, draw on statements by school personnel that
demonstrate hostility to the student criticism, evidence like that
presented in Lowery and Walker-Serrano. In addition, a reviewing court
could test the credibility of purported operational justifications for
the school’s response by examining whether school officials can
substantiate that it was the operational impact of the student’s
An individual who comes to see behavior important to his cultural group
as detrimental to society risks estrangement from those on whom he
depends for material and emotional support. If the behavior is a source of
status for the individual or for the group, then the prospect that others
might form such a belief can diminish an individual’s social standing
generally. The mechanisms that cultural cognition comprises—from
biased assimilation to selective attention and recall to skewed perceptions
of expert credibility —all derive from the impulse to dismiss evidence that
has these identity-threatening consequences.
Id. at 895.
458. Id. at 854.
459. Id. at 895–99 (describing potential corrective responses to cultural
cognition).
460. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
2007)).
461. See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue,
69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 460–61 (1995) (describing salutary effects of judicial
oversight of school officials’ restrictive responses to student speech).
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delivery of the critical message, not the message itself, which
prompted the disciplinary reaction. The integrity of this variant on a
secondary effects defense would be greatly enhanced by a showing
that the school afforded the student-critic adequate alternative
channels by which he or she could deliver the relevant complaints
and concerns.
An appraisal of the adequacy of those channels would properly
consider their visibility and accessibility, their incorporation of
protective features, such as the availability of a bypass mechanism that
would not require a student to present grievances to the school
official whose conduct is at issue, and the extent to which these
mechanisms provide transparency, allowing the public but, perhaps
even more importantly, members of the school community, including
other students, the opportunity to learn the substance of the student
462
grievance and the basis for its resolution.
This kind of scrutiny
would incentivize schools to re-examine their existing grievance
procedures, assessing how such regimes, installed to comply with the
obligations of federal civil rights laws, could be reworked to expand
students’ opportunities to register and resolve their complaints about
school life. By expanding the opportunities for students to air and
resolve grievances in school, educators might be able diffuse student
frustration and hostility and offer needed guidance to students on
how to communicate complaints in a persuasive, respectful, and
463
responsible manner.
This kind of approach could potentially

462. This mode of analysis would import an incentive structure like that used to
prevent and address workplace sexual harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (concluding that when a plaintiff alleges that a supervisor has
created hostile work environment but taken no tangible employment action, the
employer entity can assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability by showing that
the employer had taken reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually
harassing behavior and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the available complaint process and/or other preventive and corrective
mechanisms); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same). Such
a complaint procedure would have to be well-publicized, efficient, and effective to
demonstrate requisite care. To comply with federal civil rights statutes, districts are
already required to publicize and implement grievance procedures that provide for the
prompt, equitable resolution of student and employee discrimination complaints. See
34 C.F.R. § 104.7(b) (2011); id. § 104.8 (2011); id. § 106.8(b) (2011); id. § 106.9
(2011); 28 C.F.R. § 35.106 (2010); id. § 35.107(b) (2010).
463. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 179 (criticizing vicious cycle in
which schools, unwilling to trust students, deny them chances to make choices and
take responsibility at school, leading some students to act irresponsibly and, in turn,
precipitating greater restrictions on expression which ultimately exacerbate civic
competency deficits).
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reduce the mounting number of incidents involving extreme, vulgar,
464
and intemperate on-line student speech about school personnel.
A suitably demanding review should also address the nature of the
sanction imposed, exploring whether a sanction’s potential
disproportionality conveys an intent to retaliate against a student
critic and to deter future dissenters. Officials’ recourse to the most
severe sanctions, such as expulsion, long-term suspension, and
permanent ineligibility from participation in school activities, could
465
signal the presence of a problematic motive.
Perhaps most
importantly, a reviewing court would examine how the school has
engaged with the substance of a student’s grievance. Although the
use of intemperate or vulgar language to communicate a complaint
can be properly reprimanded, that defect in presentation should not
automatically nullify school officials’ obligation to acknowledge a
student’s concerns and to offer a reasoned explanation of its
resolution, including the steps taken to investigate the basis for the
466
student’s complaint. Conversely, a student who, when disciplined,
464. See generally Katherine Hokenson, Comment, My Teacher Sux! [Censored]:
Protecting Students’ Right to Free Speech on the Internet, 28 J. M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& I NFO . L. 385, 407–08 (2011) (examining proliferating controversies involving
students’ online criticism of school personnel). Cases examining such incidents
include: Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc) (invalidating suspension of high school student for creating fake
MySpace profile of principal); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (finding suspension of student for creating Facebook group entitled “Ms.
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” violated the First Amendment);
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(invalidating suspension of high school student who had e-mailed classmates “Top
Ten” list about school athletic director, deriding his appearance, including the size
of his genitals); cf. Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 111 (2d
Cir. 2012) (upholding suspension of ten-year-old fifth grader based on his crayon
drawing of astronaut expressing wish to “[b]low up the school with the teachers in
it”). For thoughtful explorations of First Amendment issues raised by student online speech, including speech directed at school officials, see Mary-Rose Papandrea,
Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008), recommending
school initiatives to educate students about responsible use of digital media as more
effective than punitive responses and more consistent with First Amendment
principles, and Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591
(2011) [hereinafter Waldman, Badmouthing Authority], recommending that school
officials have latitude to suppress dissent only under narrow interpretations what
constitutes disruptive or offensive speech.
465. See Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions
on Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303 (2012) (describing
school officials’ termination of students’ eligibility to participate in school sports
teams, student government, and other extra-curricular activities as punishment for
speech deemed disruptive).
466. See Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840–41 (N.D. Miss.
2012) (upholding students’ suspension for Facebook posting of profanity-laden rap
alleging coach’s improper behavior toward female students without addressing the
school’s investigation of the substance of the students’ accusations).
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attempts to restyle personal harassment or credible threats to harm a
teacher or administrator as a poorly crafted substantive critique
467
should not expect a warm reception from a reviewing court.
These analytical modifications would move toward a form of review
reminiscent of intermediate scrutiny, a shift responsive to what Scott
Moss has labeled the “excessive institutional tailoring” of First
Amendment doctrine in cases involving schools, government
468
workplaces, and prisons.
Moss has proposed that use of an
intermediate scrutiny standard could counteract courts’ disturbing
tendency to understate the risk of reflexively accepting relevant
institutional decision-makers’ claimed expertise in assessing the
operational costs and benefits of less restrictive expressive
469
environments. Moss asserts that the current doctrinal approach to
the protection of the speech of public school students, government
workers, and prisoners may actually exaggerate the uniqueness of
470
such institutional environments.
Courts’ too-ready acceptance of
claims that special institutional imperatives necessitate limiting
expressive freedom could obscure the real possibility that
government officials’ reactions could reflect the kind of deeply
problematic motives that justify vigorous judicial interrogation of the
471
Like the
basis for comparable restrictions outside such domains.
Moss proposal, this Article’s recommended legal standard
acknowledges that a school official is likely to be no less susceptible
than other governmental actors to the temptation to react to speech
on the basis of how it complicates the official’s administrative task or
deviates from the official’s own preferred viewpoint, potentially
472
skewing the calculus to favor the official’s own interest.
However, this Article’s central ambition in constructing its
recommended form of heightened scrutiny is the reinvigoration of
467. See Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 464, at 593 (examining the
constitutional bases for differentiating schools’ authority to respond to speech that
arguably threatens or primarily directs vulgarity at a school official and a more
complex category of student expression: “speech that, while expressing nonthreatening hostility toward a school official, also expresses a substantive viewpoint
about that official’s behavior”).
468. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635
(2007).
469. Id. at 1674–78.
470. Id. at 1671.
471. Id. at 1677, 1679.
472. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 876
(2008) (arguing that because schools and universities are “speech institutions that
enhance the marketplace of ideas,” lawmakers and courts can properly give
deference to judgments “choosing and applying rules designed to protect their
institutional missions”).
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educators’ appreciation of the uniquely significant role schools play
in cultivating students’ speech-related citizenship capabilities and of
schools’ attendant obligation to guard against the devaluation of
student dissent. By treating students’ youth and susceptibility to
473
influence as inevitable counterweights
that tip constitutional
balancing against offering latitude to dissent about issues in or
affecting the school, educators and courts fail to consider how the
stifling of such expression could derail an essential pedagogical
project for public education.
Highlighting how this kind of
miscalculation can lead to missed opportunities, Emily Buss notes
children’s need for both “controlled influence and opportunities for
rights exercise”:
Schools serve as one of the primary sites for positive influence, for
the development of basic intellectual skills, the acquisition of
knowledge, and the cultivation of prosocial behavior.
To
accomplish all this, schools need a level of control that may justify a
diminution of rights. But schools are also one of the best testing
grounds for the exercise of rights, offering students a society of
peers with whom to interact and a governmental authority
structure against which to push. Any analysis that takes only one of
these two mechanisms of influence into account is developmentally
474
incomplete.

Thus, as Buss argues, giving children the opportunity to
experiment with their rights may serve society’s interest in children
475
Providing such
becoming effective “rights exercisers”.
opportunities is particularly important because children and
476
adolescents are “[d]evelopmentally primed”
to question and
learn as they test their understandings and beliefs, including their
understandings of and beliefs about the nature of citizenship and
the authority. The experiences students have when they try to speak
to school officials, embodiments of state power, will foreseeably
shape their future habits and expectations as citizens of a
477
constitutional democracy.

473. See Buss, supra note 61, at 356 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of children’s constitutional rights that “predictably cast the
circumstances of childhood as a counterweight” to claims advancing a more
capacious framing of children’s entitlements).
474. Id. at 361–62.
475. Id. at 361.
476. Id. at 380.
477. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The equivocal reception students receive from courts when they
invoke the First Amendment’s protection against the suppression or
punishment of acts of petition and protest reveals the devaluation of
students’ citizenship and of their potential to contribute to school
improvement. From a practical perspective, such a deflated appraisal
of students’ capacities fails to apprehend the utility of student
expression, as schools work to identify and eliminate sources of
discord, dissatisfaction, and misunderstanding that compromise the
academic environment. Moreover, too hastily forestalling students’
opportunities to engage both their peers and school officials when
facing perceived injustice or dysfunction licenses school officials’
abdication or even repudiation of an implicit but essential
instructional obligation—the cultivation of constitutional citizenship
capabilities.
Lower courts’ vigilance in protecting the participatory dimensions
of citizenship at school has been inconsistent, a deficiency likely
traceable to changing cues from the Supreme Court’s student speech
cases. Marked by a gradual shift from staunch validation of the value
of discussion and dissent toward mounting apprehension about the
costs of tolerating students’ intemperate or clumsy experiments with
expression, the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents echo
many educators’ insistent assertion that a wider range of expressive
latitude for students would be incompatible with an ordered and safe
school environment. This view mistakenly communicates that
citizenship requires only obedience, not critical engagement.
The image of the student as a passive recipient of constitutional
inculcation rather than as an agent of constitutional enforcement
and institutional reform may be more palatable to school officials,
but it is not an adequate rendition of constitutional citizenship.
Schools should acknowledge that opportunities for students to air
grievances and receive respectful responses would fulfill rather than
impede schools’ instructional duties. By failing to apply sufficiently
rigorous scrutiny to school officials’ justifications for the silencing of
student dissent, courts become complicit in schools’ dereliction of
their duty to help students acquire the capabilities of citizenship.

